Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 104

Issue 1

Article 4

2015

Crowd Crush: How the Law Leaves American Crowds Unprotected
Tracy Hresko Pearl
Texas Tech University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Pearl, Tracy Hresko (2015) "Crowd Crush: How the Law Leaves American Crowds Unprotected," Kentucky
Law Journal: Vol. 104: Iss. 1, Article 4.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol104/iss1/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact
UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

Kentucky Law Journal
2015- 2016

VOLUME 104

NUMBER I

AIRTIC L ES

Crowd Crush:
How the Law Leaves American Crowds Unprotected
Tracy Hresko Pearl1
"The age we are about to enter will in truth be the Era ofCrowds. "'

-Gustave Le Bon, 1895
Crowd-relatedinjuriesand deaths are startlingly common both in
the United States and worldwide. They occur in a wide range of
situations and at a vast array of venues: at music concerts, sporting
events, retailholiday sales, in and aroundairports,subway plaorms,
and parking lots, among other locations. These "crowd crush"
incidents, however, are extremely underreportedand rarely litigated,

masking the seriousness of this issue andmaking it difficultfor the few
victims who pursue legal recourse to recover damages. Given that
there is virtually no statutory law in the United States pertainingto
crowd management and control, crowd crush cases are based entirely
in common law, most often in the law of negligence. Unfortunately,
courts have consistently made a number of analytical errors in these
cases, creating a line ofjurisprudence that is both scientifically and
legally problematicand that reduces incentives for venue owners and
event managers to take steps to reduce the likelihood offuture crowd
injuries. In this paper, I (a) identify the most signiicant of these
errors, (b) explain why they contravene crowd science, and (c) make a
'Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Texas Tech University School of Law. J.D., Boston College

Law School, 2006; M.Sc., Comparative Social Policy, Oxford University, 2003; A.B., Public Policy,
Duke University, 2002. 1 am extraordinarily grateful to Dr. G. Keith Still, Professor of Crowd Science
at Manchester Metropolitan University in the United Kingdom, for his tremendous help and feedback
on this paper. I am also indebted to Professor Howard Wasserman, Professor Matthew Mirow,
Professor Stephen Black, and Professor M. Alexander Pearl for their insightful comments and reviews,
and to my research assistants, Lauren Dellacona and Dava Spindler-Greenberg, for their excellent work.
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series of recommendationsdesigned to bring crowd crush jurisprudence
in line with modern science and to level the playingfield between
plaintiffs and defendants in these cases.

It was a typical Monday night at E2, a popular Chicago nightclub, on February
17, 2003. Patrons were enjoying the dance floor, the DJ, the bar, and wandering in
between the club and the restaurant downstairs. 4 As the night wore on, a small
fistfight broke out on the dance floor, an unfortunate but not uncommon
occurrence at a nightclub. 5 At the DJ's request, a security guard stepped in and
attempted to quell the skirmish. 6 His initial efforts unsuccessful, the guard then
escalated his response by spraying pepper spray at the combatants. 7 This action
8
proved to be disastrous.
The pepper spray lingered in the crowded room, choking the patrons and
triggering a mass exodus. 9 The dub had three exits, but one was obstructed and one
was locked, so the entire crowd was forced to leave through the front entrance of
the club. 1° As the crowd attempted to do so, however, members became trapped in
the narrow front stairwell when the front door at the bottom of the steps failed to
11
open.
The crowd that night was large: approximately 1,152 people.' 2 Some of the
individuals toward the front of the crowd fell as they descended the stairs and were
trampled to death. 13 Others became trapped against the front door.' 4 As bodies
piled up at the bottom of the stairwell, growing higher than six feet at one point,
the patrons at the top of the stairs kept pushing downward, "unaware people below
were being crushed to death as they did so." i s By the end of the incident, twenty16
one people had died and more than fifty had been injured.

3 See Jodi Wilgoren, 21 Die in Stampede ofl,500 at Chicago Nightclub, N.Y. TiMES, Feb. 18, 2003,
at Al.
4
See id. at Al, A20.
5
Id.
6 E2 Nightclub Tragedy 9th Anniversary: It's Not Over UntilIts Over, CROWD MGMT. STRATEGIES
(Feb. 17, 2012), http://www.crowdsafe.com/new.asp?ID=2128 [hereinafter E2 Nightclub Tragedy].
7 See Wilgoren, supra note 3, at Al.
' See E2 Nightclub Tragedy, supra note 6.
9Id.
10
Id.
11See id.
2 Eric Herman, Some Laughed in E2 Stampede: PatronsDid Not Know They Were Shoving Others to
Their Deaths, CHI. SuN-TIMES, Jan. 19,2007, at 9.
13See id.; see also Wilgoren, supra note 3, at Al (describing the stampede in the stairwell).
14See Herman, supra note 12, at 9.
15
Id.
16
Wilgoren, supra note 3, at Al.
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Three days later, at The Station nightclub in West Warwick, Rhode Island,7
100 people were killed and over 200 were injured under similar circumstances.1
Over 400 people entered the dub that evening to attend a concert of the 1980s
band, Great White. 8 Several seconds into the band's first song, however,
pyrotechnics set off by the band's tour manager ignited the foam insulation in the
walls and ceiling surrounding the stage, and a fire began to spread.' 9 Although the
club contained four exits, two of them were chained shut, and a bouncer initially
stopped audience members from using the third, the stage exit. These blockages
forced the vast majority of the crowd to attempt to exit via the front door, creating
a deadly bottleneck."
While these two incidents are somewhat unusual due to their high number of
fatalities, crowd-related injuries and deaths are troublingly common, both in the
United States and throughout the rest of the world. While exact numbers are
hard to come by, one recent study calculated that, in the ten-year period between
1992 and 2002, there were 232 deaths and over 66,000 injuries in crowd-related
incidents worldwide. 22 Another crowd expert estimates that the annual number of
people who receive medical attention for crowd-related injuries "ranges between
20,000 to 40,000."23 These injuries and fatalities occur in a wide range of situations:
at Black Friday sales, 24 music concerts, 25 sporting events, 26 and large festivals, 2 7 as
17Great White Concert Tragedy: Tenth Anniversary, CROWD MGMT. STRATEGIES (Feb. 20 2013),
http://www.crowdsafe.com/new.asp?ID= 2195.
" Bernie Augustine, The Station Nightclub Fire 10 Years Later: Healing Continues as West Warwick,

Rhode Island, Takes Next Step in Recovery, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Feb. 21, 2013),
http'//www.nydailynews.com/news/national/ten-years-station -nighclub- fire-town-recovering-article1.1269044.
19 Pat Pemberton, The Great White Nightclub Fire: Ten Years Later, ROLLING STONE (July 15,
2013),
http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/the-great-white-nightdub-fire-ten-years-ater20130715.
2 Id.
21See, e.g., Victoria C. Dawson, Who Is Responsible When You Shop Until You Drop?: An Impact on the
Use of the Aggressive Marketing Schemes of"Black Friday"Through EnterpriseLiabilityConcepts, 50 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 747, 748-49 (2010); Dirk Helbing et -al., Crowd Turbulence: The Physics of Crowd

Disasters, Fifth International Conference on Nonlinear Mechanics 969 (June 11-14, 2007),
http://arxiv.org/pdf/0708.3339.pdf.
2 Steven A. Adelman, Won't Get FooledAgain, TRIAL, June 2004, at 18, 18.
2 20 Die at Concerts and Festivals in 2002, CROWD MGMT. STRATEGIES (Mar. 24, 2003),

http://crowdsafe.com/rcssllnr.pdf.
24See, e.g., Dawson, supra note 21, at 749.
5 See, e.g., Chicago Fans Sue Beyonci After Being "Trampled"at Concert, NBC CHI. (Apr. 2, 2014,

11:50 AM), http://www.nbcchicago.com/news/local/Chicago-Fans-Trampled-at-Beyonce-ConcertFile-Suit-253585421.html; 20 Die at Concerts andFestivals, supra note 23.
26

See, e.g., PHIL SCRATON ET AL., NO LAST RIGHTS: THE DENIAL OF JUSTICE AND THE

PROMOTION OF MYTH IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE HILLSBOROUGH DISASTER iiv-iv (Alden Press

1995); Joseph Berger, An Inquiry Spreads Blamefor Deaths at a New York Gym, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16,
1992, at Al; Cynthia Schuster, 20 Years Later,Lessons Still Relevantfrom Camp Randall Stampede, WiS.

PUB. RADIO (Oct. 25, 2013, 2:00 AM), http://www.wpr.org/20-years-later-lessons-still-relevant-camprandall-stampede.
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well as on subway platforms 28 and in casino parking lots.29 They occur among
spectators in "traditionally rougher crowd sports," such as basketball and ice
hockey, and among spectators in "more subdued sports such as golf and horse
racing."3 ° They occur at boisterous rock concerts, 3 as well as in the seemingly more
32
genteel corridors of Radio City Music Hall.
Regardless of how and where they occur, scientists and scholars are in
agreement about two things: crowd-related injuries are both (1) vastly unreported
and (2) increasing in frequency. 33 One scholar estimates "that only one out of every
ten [crowd] injuries associated with doorbuster sales" at popular stores is reported. 34
Another notes that "the vast number of concert injuries.., go unreported" because
of "the inadequate measures used to gather concert-injury information," even
35
though "concerts have undoubtedly become more dangerous in recent years."
Commentators worriedly point to the uptick in crowd injuries and deaths inthe
last few decades. 36 This increase is not particularly surprising given both a growing
population in urban centers and the resulting increase in the size and usage of
modem venues and public spaces. For instance, "[a] major sporting or
entertainment event can attract 70,000 avid fans [and] [l]arge transportation
terminals such as New York Grand Central Terminal and Pennsylvania Station
37
accommodate 200,000 passengers each weekday."
The United States has an unusually high number of crowd crush incidents for a
country in the developed world.38 One expert notes that the United States is
responsible for thirty-seven percent of the concert-related crowd injuries
2

7 E.g., 'Crowd Quakes' Were a Key Factorin LoveParadeDisaster,NIT TECH. REV. (June 28, 2012),

http://www.technologyreview.com/view/428367/crowd-quakes -were-a-key-factor-in-loveparadedisaster/.
E.g., Alexopoulos v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 41 A.D.3d 171, 171 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007).
DiMauro v. Trump's Castle Assocs., 300 A.D.2d 432, 433 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002).
0 Gil Fried & Robert Metchick, Camp Randall Memorial Stadium Case Study: University of
Wisconsin-October30, 1993, 15 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 139, 143 (2005).
" E.g., John J. Fruin, The Causes and Prevention of Crowd Disasters, CROWDSAFE 3 (Jan. 2002),

http://www.crowdsafe.com/fruincauses.pdf [hereinafter Fruin, Causes and Prevention].
" Custini v. Radio City Prods., LLC, No. 604084/2006, slip op. at 2-4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., July 27,
2009).
33See infra text accompanying notes 34-37.
Dawson, supra note 21, at 764.
s Luke Ellis, Note, Talking About My Generation: Assumption of Risk and the Rights of Injured
ConcertFans in the Twenty-First Century, 80 TEX. L. REV. 607, 608 (2002).
16 See, e.g., id.("The number of concert-goers seriously injured or killed at concerts in recent years

has increased drastically."); James L. Curtis et al., Holiday Shopping and Crowd Management Safety
Guidelines for Retailers, SEYFARTH SHAW ENVTL. & SAFETY LAW UPDATE (Nov. 13, 2012),

http'//www.environmentalsafetyupdate.com/osha-enforcement/holiday-shopping-and-crowdmanagement-safety-guidelines-for-retailers ("Holiday shopping is increasingly becoming associated
with violence and hazards.").
17Fruin, Causes and Prevention, supra note 31, at 1.
"' See A Trust Betrayed: Safety Became the Twelfth Victim, CROWD MGMT. STRATEGIES,

http://www.crowdsafe.com/cafe/who20.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2015).
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worldwide. 39 The United States' relationship with such incidents, moreover, is a
long and storied one. Even a brief search yields cases of crowd injuries in the
United States dating back to the 1900s, and crowd disasters such as the 1942
Cocoanut Grove fire have lingered in public consciousness. 4° Despite the frequency
of crowd crush injuries and deaths in the United States, however, the common law
jurisprudence that has developed around liability for these incidents is remarkably
problematic and worth examining for two reasons. First, courts in the United
States have consistently made a number of serious analytical errors when
purporting to analyze liability in these cases. These errors, in turn, make it overly
difficult for plaintiffs to recover. Second, unlike many of its peers in the developed
world, the United States has taken virtually no legislative steps to address the
growing number of crowd injuries within its borders, so common law remains the
41
only source of law with regard to crowd crush.
In this paper, I examine the current state of common law as it applies to crowdrelated injuries and deaths ("crowd crush" injuries). I argue that the jurisprudence
arising out of crowd crush incidents is incredibly troublesome because (1) it is
riddled with assumptions and analyses that contravene basic principles of crowd
science, (2) it makes recovery overly difficult for plaintiffs, and (3) it does nothing
to either incentivize or require venue owners or events managers to employ even
simple crowd management techniques that would drastically reduce the chances of
such incidents occurring in the future. In Part I of this Article, I examine the
science of crowd dynamics and explain why this science should provide central
guiding principles for courts tasked with hearing crowd crush cases. In Part II, I
address the common law jurisprudence of crowd crush cases, identify several
common errors courts make when analyzing these cases, and explain why those
errors run afoul of the science discussed in Part I. In Part III, I make a series of
recommendations for courts faced with crowd crush litigation. These
recommendations are aimed at bringing crowd crush jurisprudence in line with
modern science and creating a more even playing field between plaintiffs and
defendants in these cases.
I. THE SCIENCE OF CROWD INCIDENTS

While virtually everyone probably has an intuitive sense of what a crowd is-we
know one when see one, as the saying goes-defining the term from an academic
perspective is surprisingly difficult and "has not been completely resolved in the

39id.

0 Lawrence M. Friedman & Joseph Thompson, Total Disasterand TotalJustice: Responses to ManMade Tragedy, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 251, 256-76 (2003); see The CocoanutGrove Fire, Bos. FIRE HIST.
SOCY, http://www.bostonfirehistory.org/firestoryl1281942.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2015).
41 See Ellis, supra note 35, at 629.
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relevant literature."42 Broadly speaking, however, a crowd can be defined as a
number of individuals "in the same area in physical proximity to one another."4 3
44
While "[a] definite numerical minimum [of individuals] cannot be stipulated,"
four interacting elements are present in any crowd: time, space, information, and
energy:
The time is simply the period during which the crowding occurs; space, the size
and configuration of the area occupied; information, the perceptions by those in
the crowd, real or imagined, that cause it to take some group action; and energy,
the pressures created by massed pedestrians that can result in accidents and death.
Analysis of more than a dozen serious crowd incidents has shown that in all cases
these elements have played a critical role, and that management strategies based
on one or more
of these elements could have averted or significandy reduced
5
crowd effects.

All of these elements are important considerations when assessing and
preventing crowd crush injuries, as discussed below. From a scientific perspective,
however, crowd density is the single most important predictor of crowd-related
46
injuries and deaths and thus the linchpin of crowd-disaster analysis.
A. Crowd Density

Crowd density is a measurement of "the number of people per square met[er]"
in a given crowd.4 7 It is an extremely good predictor of the likelihood of crowd
crush injuries or death occurring in a given crowd. 41 At a crowd density of two
people per square meter, for instance, individuals are completely "decoupled'-they
can move about freely without making physical contact with each other-and thus
the likelihood of a crowd-related injury is virtually zero. 49 Crowd densities of three
and four people per square meter are similarly low-risk from a crowd-injury

42 Eugene Trivizas, Crowd Dynamics and the Prevention and Control of Collective Disorders, 56
POLICEJ. 142, 143 (1983).
43id.
4id.
45
John J. Fruin, Crowd Dynamics andAuditoriumManagement, CROwD SAFETY & RISK ANALYSIS
(Mar. 1, 2015, 2:42 PM), http://www.gkstill.com/Support/crowd-flow/fruin/Fruin3.html [hereinafter
Fruin, Crowd Dynamics].
' See Helbing, supra note 21, at 1-3, at 967-68; Fruin, Causes and Prevention,supra note 31, at 4, 6;
Fruin, Crowd Dynamics, supra note 45; Ris S.C. Lee & Roger L. Hughes, Exploring Trampling and
Crushing in a Crowd, 131 J. TRANSP. ENGINEERING 575, 581 (2005); Mehdi Moussaid et al., How
Simple Rules DeterminePedestrianBehavior and CrowdDisasters,108 PNAS 6884,6884, 6886 (2011).
47 G. Keith Still, Static Crowd Density (General), CROWD SAFETY & RISK ANALYSIS (Apr. 12,
2014, 9:23 AM), www.gkstill.com/Support/crowd-density/CrowdDensity-l.html.
4' Lee & Hughes, supra note 46, at 581.
" See Dirk Oberhagemann, Static and Dynamic Crowd Densities at Major Public Events, VFDB
TECHNICAL REP. (Mar. 2012), www.vfdb.de/download/TB_1301 Crowd_densities.pdf.
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perspective. 50 At five people per square meter, however, the likelihood that an
injury will occur begins to increase. 5' At that density, "there is still ample space
between people to allow movement, though it is limited."52 One study, moreover,
identifies five people per square meter as "[t]he critical density for an accident
involving trampling"; there is a high risk of injury from falling and being stepped
53
on in a crowd of this density.
At crowd densities of roughly seven people per square meter or more, the risk of
crowd-related injuries or deaths is extremely high. 54 At this density, a "surprising
transition"55 occurs: the ability of individuals to control their own movement is lost
almost completely and "shock waves" begin to ripple back and forth through the
crowd. 56 These waves are "characterized by random displacements of [crowd
members] into all possible directions up to twelve meters or more." 57 Scientists
studying crowd dynamics note that principles of fluid dynamics best describe and
predict crowd movements at this density.58 One notes that "[p]eople caught in a
crowd crush behave as a liquid. No individual can control his or her movement or
assist others close by."5 9 Another states:
At occupancies of about 7 persons per square meter the crowd becomes almost a
fluid mass. Shock waves can be propagated through the mass sufficient to lift
people off of their feet .... People may be literally lifted out of their shoes, and
have clothing torn off. Intense crowd pressures, exacerbated by anxiety, make it
difficult to breathe. The heat and thermal insulation of surrounding bodies cause
some to be weakened and faint. Access to those who fall is impossible. Removal
of those in distress can only be accomplished by lifting them up and passing them
overhead to the exterior of the crowd.6

The forces produced by crowds at this density are deadly and "almost
impossible to stop."6 Indeed, "[e]vidence of bent steel railings after several fatal
crowd incidents" shows that dense crowds can exert forces of more than 1,000
" See id. (indicating that there is no real increase in the likelihood of a crowd crush event between
two people per square meter and under five people per square meter).
s Lee & Hughes, supra note 46, at 581.
s2Oberhagemann, supra note 49, at 11.
Lee & Hughes, supra note 46, at 581.
, See Fruin, Causes and Prevention, supra note 31, at 4. There is some variability with regard to the
density at which a crowd becomes likely to experience a crowd crush. Variations in the average size of
the crowd members themselves and the extent to which crowd members are dressed in bulky clothing
may shift this number up or down. See Lee & Hughes, supra note 46, at 579.
" Helbing, supra note 21, at 968.
16Fruin, Causes andPrevention, supranote 31, at 4; see also Helbing, supra note 21, at 967-68.
17Helbing, supra note 21, at 968.
51 See Soo Chin Pin et al., Applying TRIZ Principles in Crowd Management, 49 SAFETY SCI. 286,

287 (2011).
59Adelman, supra note 22, at 19.
o Fruin, Causes and Prevention, supranote 31, at 4.
61Fruin, CrowdDynamics, supra note 45.
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pounds at a time.6 2 Accordingly, the largest risk to crowd members in these
situations is a medical phenomenon known as "compressive asphyxiation": being
suffocated to death while on one's feet by the forces exerted by the surrounding
63
crowd.
This horrifying phenomenon is precisely what occurred on December 3, 1979,
when eleven people were asphyxiated in a crowd crush at a Cincinnati, Ohio rock
concert by The Who. 64 Arena managers opened only two doors into the venue
despite the fact that 8,000 people were outside the arena waiting to enter.65 When
a warm-up band began to play on the main stage, these fans began to push toward
the two entrances thinking the performance had begun, increasing the crowd's
66
density to dangerous levels and creating the type of shock waves discussed above.
One scholar who has extensively studied the incident reports:
The crowd was tightly packed within the space outside the arena doors . .. with
the greatest crush near the doors to the right (south) of the lobby .... The crowd
density became so great that one person reported that he could not raise his arm
to scratch his head... and another said he could not reach to his pocket for his
wallet .... Others referred to being lifted from the pavement and carried along
by the crowd's movement, unable to get their feet back on the concrete surface. 7

A concertgoer remembers:
A wave swept me to the left and when I regained my stance I felt that I was
standing on someone. The helplessness and frustration of this moment sent a
wave of panic through me. I screamed with all my strength that I was standing on
someone. I couldn't move. I could only scream. Another wave came and pushed
me further left towards the door. I felt my leg being pulled to the right. The
crowd shifted again and I reached down and grabbed an arm at my leg. I
struggled for a while and fimally pulled up a young girl who also had a young boy
clinging to her limbs. They were barely conscious and their faces were filled with
6

tears. "

Similar phenomena have been reported as having occurred in virtually every
69
other major crowd crush incident on record.
62Fruin, Causes and Prevention, supra note 31, at 5.
63id.

6 Id. at3.
65 Id.

66See id.
67 Norris R. Johnson, Panic at 'The Who Concert Stampede": An EmpiricalAssessment, 34 Soc.
PROBS. 362, 365 (1987).
68 About The Who Concert Tragedy Task Force Report, CROWD MGMT.

STRATEGIES,

http//www.crowdsafe.com/taskrpt/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2015) [hereinafter About The Who Concert
Tragedy].
69 See, e.g., MIVLTON MOLLEN, "A FAILURE OF RESPONSIBILITYI: REPORT TO MAYOR DAVID
N. DINKINS ON THE DECEMBER 28, 1991 TRAGEDY AT CITY COLLEGE OF NEW YORK 23-35

(1992) (describing the City College crowd crush); Fried & Metchick, supra note 30, at 140 (2005)

2015-2016]

CROWD CRUSH

Crowd density is thus not only an excellent predictor of crowd-related injuries
and deaths, awareness of it is a central component of keeping crowds safe: keeping
crowd densities below critical levels drastically reduces the chances that injury or
deaths will occur. 70 Managing crowd density, in turn, requires careful attention to
another key component of crowd science
analysis: assessment of the physical space
71
move.
must
crowd
a
which
through
B. PhysicalSpace
A large number of people alone is insufficient to create a dangerous crowd
density. A gathering of over 50,000 people could stay at a very low crowd density if
spread out over two square miles of open space, as, for instance, at the popular
Burning Man festival that occurs each year in the Nevada desert. Instead, it is
"[t]he configuration, capacity, and traffic processing capabilities of assembly
facilities" rather than the sheer number of attendees that determines crowd density
and thus the degree of crowding. 72 Two types of physical space configurations in
particular drastically increase the risk of a crowd crush occurring: bottlenecks and
festival seating.
1. Bottlenecks-Venues, spaces, and corridors that allow individuals to distribute
themselves "uniformly over the domain" reduce the likelihood that crowds will
reach a high-risk density and thus minimize the risk of injury. 73 Conversely, spaces
and architectural features that "rigidly confine people within an inadequate space"
or force crowds to move through "bottlenecks" drastically increase the likelihood
that a crowd will reach a critical density and trigger a crowd crush. 74 In bottleneck
situations, though a portion of the crowd is slowed and compressed at a precarious
location, the crowd behind it "continues to press ahead because it has no
knowledge of what conditions are at the bottleneck."75 This ongoing forward
movement of the back portion of the crowd can, in turn, result in a dangerous
amount of pressure being exerted on the portion of the crowd already tightly
packed together at the bottleneck.

(describing the Camp Randall Memorial Stadium crowd crush); Lord Justice Taylor, Hillsborougb
Stadium DisasterInquiry--InterimReport, SOUTH YORKSHIRE POLICE 11-15 (Apr. 15, 1989), available
at http://www.southyorks.police.uk/sites/default/filesfaylor%201nterim%2OReport.pdf (describing the

Hillsborough crowd crush).
o See Lee & Hughes, supra note 46, at 581.
71 See Kathryn M. Zeitz et al., Crowd Behavior at Mass Gatherings: A Literature Review, 24
PREHOSP1TAL AND DISASTER MED. 32,37 (2009).
7 Fruin, Causes and Prevention,supra note 31, at 5.

7' See Lee & Hughes, supra note 46, at 37.
" Fruin, CrowdDynamics, supra note 45; Moussaid et al., supra note 46, at 6886.
7' Fruin, Crowd Dynamics, supra note 45.
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Problematic physical spaces that may result in bottleneck phenomena include
narrow hallways and stairwells, insufficient numbers of entrances and exits, the use
of escalators (which force crowds to funnel themselves into the narrow entryways
onto escalator steps), and corridors that require crowds to make tight turns. 76 They
may also include smaller and more temporary features of a facility: barricades,
holiday decorations, trashcans, concession tables, artistic sculptures, or even
random pieces of trash or debris that a crowd must move around. As one crowd
expert notes, even "[m]inor design deficiencies that present no apparent problems
under normal traffic conditions can be accentuated
in crowds, potentially triggering
77
more dangerous, 'domino effect' accidents."
A series of bottlenecks was a significant cause of the December 28, 1991 crowd
crush at the City College of New York during which eight people died and scores
more were injured (a ninth victim died several days later as a result of injuries
sustained during the incident).71 Over 5,000 people showed up for a celebrity
79
basketball game that day and began to enter a City College gymnasium.
Unfortunately, in so doing, the crowd had to work its way through at least four
bottlenecks. First, even though the gymnasium had several main entrances, all
except one-the 138th Street entrance-remained dosed, forcing the entire crowd
to enter through one set of doors. 80 Second, once inside the main doors, the crowd
had to enter a small interior vestibule and negotiate a second set of doors in order
to enter into the larger main lobby of the gymnasium. 8' Third, once through the
lobby, the crowd had to descend a twelve-by-seven foot stairwell into the gym,
forcing the crowd to funnel itself through yet another narrow corridor. 82 Fourth,
while four metal fire doors were positioned at the bottom of the stairwell (all of
which could be opened only into the stairwell rather than into the gymnasium),
only a single door at the far left-hand side of the bottom83of the stairwell had been
opened, forcing the crowd to compress itself even further.
This last bottleneck proved to be the deadliest. As the crowd surged into the
stairwell, individuals at the bottom of the stairs were pushed up against the three
closed doors of the gymnasium. 4 Those at the front perished as "the crowd
76 Id.; see also, e.g., Haley v. May Dept. Stores Co., 287 S.W.2d 366, 367 (Mo. Ct. App. 1956)

(discussing a crowd crush that occurred on an escalator).
' Fruin, Crowd Dynamics, supra note 45.
78
MOLLEN, supra note 69, at 1; Fruin, Causes andPrevention, supra note 31, at 2.
"' Berger, supra note 26, at Al, B8.
goMOLLEN, supra note 69, at 25. After the situation in and around the 138th Street entrance
became desperate, officials opened one additional entrance--the 136th Street entrance-but that, too,
became quickly overwhelmed by the large number of people attempting to enter the facility. Id. at 2930.
81 See id. at 23-24.
5

1d.
I

Id. at 24, 26. One report suggested that this lone open door actually became shut at some point

during the crowd crush. Berger, supra note 26, at Al, B8.
84See MOLLEN, supra note 69, at 33-34.
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continued to push forward and force themselves into [the] already overcrowded
stairwell." 5 The chief medical examiner concluded that the cause of death for each
of the victims was compressive asphyxiation. 6 This incident sadly confirms the
findings of crowd scientists that "[g]enerally, the highest pressures are felt by those
pedestrians near any barrier that is checking the advance of the crowd. These
people may be crushed to death against barriers or between one another. With the
air squeezed from their lungs, they suffocate."'
Once a crowd negotiates a physical space in order to reach its destination, there
may still be high risks of crowd crush even if there are no longer any bottlenecks to
be traversed. Situations involving "festival" seating, in particular, pose such a
heightened risk of crowd injuries and deaths.
2. Unassigned ("Festival") Seating-Venues that host music concerts and other
large performance events often utilize one of two forms of unassigned seating
(although both forms are often collectively referred to as "festival seating"
arrangements): (1) festival "seating" in which the entire event is standing room only
and there are either no or only a limited number of reserved seats for attendees, and
(2) general admission seating, in which there are seats available for crowd members
but most or all of them are unreserved.88 In both of these arrangements, valuable
space within a given venue is "up for grabs." 89 When the doors to the event are
opened, the waiting crowd must rush to get the best positions inside, usually those
up front closest to the entertainment. 9° Many entertainers strongly prefer such
arrangements. U2, for instance, "will not sign a contract with any venue unless it
permits festival seating," and Bruce Springsteen has noted that he likes the "energy"
and "vibe" of such shows, where fans are packed in dose to the stage where he is
91
performing.
Despite its appeal to industry performers, however, festival seating
arrangements pose a very high risk of crowd-related injuries. 92 The National Fire
Protection Administration has stated that festival seating at live entertainment
events should be "expected to result in overcrowding and high audience density that

a' Id. at 55.
16Id. at 42.
's Lee & Hughes, supra note 46, at 580; see also Moussaid et al., supra note 46, at 6886 ("A further
analysis of the phenomenon reveals areas of serious body compression occurring close to the
bottleneck").
Is CROWD MGMT., REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON CROWD CONTROL AND SAFETY 28
(1980), availableat http'//www.crowdsafe.com/taskrpt/whoii-seating.pdf.
s See Adelman, supra note 22, at 18.
0 Id.; Fruin, Causes andPrevention, supra note 31, at 4.
1 Adelman, supra note 22, at 19.
92 See Helbing, supra note 21, at 967; Je'Anna Lanza Abbott & Morgan W. Geddie, Event and
Venue Management: Minimizing Liability Through Effective Crowd Management Techniques, 6 EVENT

MGMT. 259, 260 (2000).
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may compromise public safety," 93 and a number of crowd science experts have
94
named festival seating as the "the principal culprit in most crowd crush cases."
Indeed, "[o]ne estimate suggests that ninety percent of all concert injuries occur at
festival-seating and general-admission concerts."95 The high likelihood of injuries
in these scenarios arises from two factors.
First, in festival seating and general admission situations, crowd members must
"compe[te] for favorable seats or standing positions close to entertainers," creating a
"rush to obtain some highly valued objective."96 This sense of competition may
induce large crowds to gather hours before an event is scheduled to begin in hopes
of securing a spot at the front of the line (thus seemingly increasing the chances
that a preferred spot within the venue will be attained when the doors finally
open). 97 These gatherings, in turn, can create high-density crowds both outside the
venue and in entryways and corridors when venue doors are opened and the crowd
pushes through the entrance(s) in a rush to get the best positions. 98 The Who
concert disaster discussed above involved exactly this scenario:
For more than 14,000 fans--out of approximately 18,500 the only viewing
options inside [the venue] were festival seating.., or general admission.... That
is why thousands of loyal Who fans came to the concert hours early to stand in
the chilled wintry evening. They knew that the best concert viewing positions
would be up for grabs once the doors opened. Anticipation ran high as the
friendly crowd amassed.99

Once the doors opened, "the waiting crowd rushed the entrance to get the best
positions inside."1°' The result, as described above, was pandemonium and a deadly
crowd crush.10'
More recently, two concertgoers allege that a similar incident occurred at a
December 2013 Beyonc6 concert in Chicago, Illinois.10 2 General admission ticket
holders assembled outside the arena hours before the concert was slated to begin,
and "[a]s the hours passed, the group became larger, more dense and more anxious
about how, when and where the gate(s) would be released." 0 3 When the gates were

93 NAT'L FIRE PROTECTION ASS'N, LIFE SAFETY CODE HANDBOOK 2003 § A.3.3.188.1 (9th

ed. 2003).
9 Adelman, supra note 22, at 18.
SEllis, supra note 35, at 611.
96Fruin, Causes and Prevention,supra note 31, at 4.
9' See About The Who Concert Tragedy, supra note 68.

9' See Adelman, supra note 22, at 18; About The Who Concert Tragedy, supra note 68.
99

About The Who Concert Tragedy, supra note 68.

" Adelman, supra note 22, at 18.
101See id.
"

Eliana Dockterman, Beyonc! Sued By Fans Trampled' At Concert, TIME, Apr. 2, 2014,

http'//time.com/46879/fans-sue-beyonce -after-being-trampled-before-concert/.
103 Complaint at 3, Castellanos v. United Ctr. Joint Venture, 2014-L-003667 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Apr. 1,
2014).

2015-2016]

CROWD CRUSH

finally opened, the crowd allegedly rushed into the arena and trampled the
plaintiffs, leaving them with broken bones and other injuries.' °4 The resulting
105
lawsuit is still pending.
Second, once inside the venue and in place (at least theoretically), crowd
crushes can occur when crowd members push forward towards the stage (or other
location of the entertainment) once a performance begins."° The density towards
the front of the crowd can reach dangerous levels quickly, and crowd members at
the very front may be pinned against the stage itself. A crowd crush incident arising
out of a 2002 Eminem performance at RFK Stadium in Washington, DC, provides
an unfortunate yet clear demonstration of this phenomenon in action. The
Baltimore Sun reports:
Rap star Eminem was on the stage at about 7:40 p.m. when fans started pushing
toward him. He stopped playing at least once and cautioned fans to calm down
and stop pushing, witnesses said. But the surging crowd continued to push,
crushing some against the stage... . "'There was nowhere we could go; everybody
was pushing down, trying to get out," said Justin Kronmeyer, 17, of Hanover, Pa.
"People were screaming. There were girls getting trampled. People came from
57
every direction.""

Thirty people were injured, including one young crowd member who went into
1°8
cardiac arrest.
C. Crowd Psychology

Despite what the incidents described above may suggest to people not wellversed in crowd science, studies have consistently shown that crowd behavior is
rarely irrational or "crazed."t ° Instead, scientists have found the opposite: "that an
unorchestrated crowd behaves rationally."" ° Scientists assert that this rationality is
present in crowds because, in most situations, "members of the crowds have dear
knowledge of what and where their goals lie": entering a stadium, moving closer to
the entertainment, returning to the parking lot, etc."'
lo'
Id. at 5.
"' See Docket, Castellanos v. United Ctr. Joint Venture, 2014-L-003667 (Ill. Cir. Ct., Apr. 1,
2014).
106 ROBERT LIND ET AL., ENTERTAINMENT

LAW 3D: LEGAL CONCEPTS AND BUSINESS

PRACTICES § 10:36, Westlaw (database updated May 2014) ("More often than not, the fans choose to
get as close to the performers on stage as possible. This can result in the crowd attempting to get closer
to the stage, crushing the fans towards the front of the crowd.").
107Tanika White, 30 Hurt in Concert Crush at Washington Stadium, BALT. SUN (May 26, 2002),
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2002-05-26/news/0205260206-1_eminem-fans-crush.
108
Id.
"'sSee Lee & Hughes, supra note 46, at 575.
110
Id.
"id
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Furthermore, despite what media accounts of crowd incidents may suggest,
there is very little evidence suggesting that crowds are prone to panic or
unreasonable behavior. 12 Not only are documented cases of true crowd panic
"surprisingly scarce in the literature,"1 13 closer investigation of such incidents
usually reveals both (a) that the crowd responded rationally to a real or perceived
threat,'
and (b) that "[u]nregulated competition, which is crucial to most
explanations of panic, did not occur," but rather "cooperative behavior continued
throughout the course of the event. "1 15 Even in situations in which crowds have
reacted dramatically to a real or perceived threat, subsequent investigations have
almost always shown that "flight was a reasonable group reaction under the
perceived circumstances" and that "mutual cooperation and assistance" rather than
16
"destructive behavior" was the norm among individuals within the group.
However, crowds are often unfairly deemed irrational or "out of control,"
because of a characteristic that is inherent in almost every crowd, particularly those
of high densities: the lack of communication between the front of the crowd and
the back- 1 7 "People in a crowd do not have a broad view of what is happening
around them," notes one crowd expert. 118 Instead, "[p]sychologists have likened a
crowd to a series of intermeshing behavioral cells. Each cell is comprised of a small
group of surrounding people, with limited communication between them." 9 As a
result, when crowds reach high-risk densities, people at the back of the crowd may
continue to press forward even though individuals at the front of the crowd are in
severe distress.12 ° Indeed, unless the venue has some way of both overseeing and
addressing the entire crowd, members at the back of the crowd have virtually no
way of knowing that a crisis is occurring up front.12 ' Moreover, in many situations,
"[t]he collapsing of the front ranks [of the crowd] gives a false perception of
forward movement" so that individuals at the back of the crowd may reasonably
believe that all is well and that the crowd is continuing to move forward
smoothly. 122 Thus, contrary to frequent allegations that crowd members behaved

badly during crowd crushes, the overwhelming bulk of available evidence suggests
that crowd members behaved rationally under the circumstances in virtually every
crowd crush incident on record.
112

G. KEITH STILL, INTRODUCTION TO CROWD SCIENCE 29 (2013) ("Since 2001, the headlines

continue to attribute blame by the constant, and inappropriate, use of the words 'panic' and
'stampede.'").
13 Johnson, supra note 67, at 371.
..Fruin, Causes and Prevention,supra note 31, at 4.
115
Johnson, supra note 67, at 370.
116 Fruin, Causes and Prevention,supra note 31, at 4.
117See id.
"1 Fruin, Crowd Dynamics, supra note 45.
1 Fruin, Causes and Prevention, supra note 31, at 4.

120Id.

121See id.
122ida.
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This rational behavior on the part of crowds is scientifically significant because
it means that crowds are highly predictable-even in emergency situations-and
that "[t]he motion of a crowd can therefore be modeled using engineering
principles." 12 3 This predictability is also highly significant to the legal notions of
breach and causation (and thus liability overall), as discussed below.
II. CROWD CRUSH IN THE COURTS
Despite the frequency with which crowd crush injuries occur, the jurisprudence
124
surrounding liability for these injuries is remarkably sparse and inconsistent.
Even though crowd crush cases date back to the early 1930s, courts have largely
failed to establish a body of legal standards or even guidelines to assist in assessing
liability in these cases. 125 Instead, courts have taken a mostly ad hoc approach to
crowd crush cases, 126 using a combination of conventional wisdom about crowds
and general principles of tort law to rule on liability. Courts have also almost
in recent decades to predict
entirely ignored the body of science that has emerged
127
and explain crowd dynamics and management.
The law's "underdevelopment" in crowd crush cases, though problematic for the
reasons discussed herein, is not particularly surprising for several reasons. First, as
discussed above, crowd crush injuries are severely underreported. 128 Additionally,
only a small percentage of the crowd injuries that are in fact reported result in
litigation, and the vast majority of the few cases that are brought settle, leaving only

a small handfl
123

of opportunities for courts to develop the common law

Lee & Hughes, supra note 46, at 575.

124 See, e.g., Dawson, supra note 21, at 808-09 ("The inconsistencies between the individual

negligence cases-with sufficient cohesiveness among the plaintiffs and injuries derived out of the same
type of event or course of conduct by the retailers-all resulted in different outcomes under the
negligence regime."); Ellis, supra note 35, at 609; see also 8 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, PERSONAL INJURY
ACTIONS, DEFENSES, AND DAMAGES § 42.01 (Matthew Bender, rev. ed. 2015) ("Courts in Illinois
and New York have reached the same result on similar facts. This view is not unanimous, however, as
the courts of other states have denied liability on analogous facts.").
' See Ellis, supra note 35, at 607-09 ("Unfortunately, the relevant case law and literature do not
provide much guidance in suggesting a legal paradigm to handle modern concert injuries . . . making
this a relatively unexplored area of the law."). The one exception is New York, where courts have
established a fairly vague standard for assessing liability in crowd crush cases: plaintiffs in these cases
must establish that they were "unable to find a place of safety or that [their] free movement was
restricted due to the alleged overcrowding conditions." Palmieri v. Ringling Bros. & Barnum & Bailey
Combined Shows, 237 A.D.2d 589, 589 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (citing Benanti v. Port Auth., 176
A.D.2d 549,549 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991)).
16 See FRuMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 124 ("Cases of injury caused by a
panicking crowd demonstrate how often crowd control matters are decided on their facts.").
117 See Fruin, Crowd Dynamics, supra note 45 ("Frequently, [crowd crush] accidents result in liability
claims, based on allegations of negligence in Facility design or management. Most of these accidents are
found to be caused by personal carelessness, but a few reveal lack of understanding of the dynamics of
crowds.").
125Dawson, supranote 21, at 764; Ellis, supra note 35, at 608.
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jurisprudence in this area. 29 Second, there are virtually no statutory laws to guide
courts in these cases; only one state has passed any law pertaining to crowd
management and safety.' 30 These two factors make crowd crush litigation
unpredictable and arguably unappealing to potential plaintiffs who, at least in the
case of concert-related crowd crush injuries, are usually faced with defendants who
are "media behemoths that can spend lavishly to defend their policies." 13' These
obstacles, in turn, perpetuate the weakness and inconsistency of the jurisprudence
in this area; potential plaintiffs are often deterred from filing suit and those that do
file suit feel pressured to settle because of the unpredictability of litigation in this
32
area, so courts "miss the opportunity to establish guiding precedent."
As a result of this situation, the common law jurisprudence surrounding crowd
crush is a veritable mixed bag of standards and rulings. 33 Cases dating back to the
1940s and earlier are often the only published decisions relating to crowd-related
injuries in many jurisdictions;13 1 thus, many decisions that we would now find
problematic from a scientific perspective are still binding precedent. Moreover,
courts are currently split on, among other critical legal issues, whether crowd
crushes are foreseeable;135 whether the acts of individual crowd members are
intervening, superseding causes of plaintiffs' injuries; 36 and whether individuals
assume the risk of injury when they enter a crowd. 3 7 Crowd science arguably
129 Ellis, supra note 35, at 609.

'30See id. at 629-31.
131Adelman, supra note 22, at 18.
13' Ellis, supra note 35, at 609.
133See Dawson, supra note 21, at 808-09; Ellis, supra note 35, at 609.

" See Greeley v. Miller's Inc., 150 A. 500, 500-01 (Conn. 1930); Klish v. Alaskan Amusement
Co., 109 P.2d 75, 75-76 (Kan. 1941); Phoenix Amusement Co. v. White, 208 S.W.2d 64, 65 (Ky.
1948); Bell v. Feibleman & Co., 164 So. 273, 273 (La. Ct. App. 1935); Myers v. Kan. City Junior
Orpheum Co., 73 S.W.2d 313, 313 (Mo. Ct. App. 1934); Pridgen v. S.H. Kress & Co., 196 S.E. 82122 (N.C. 1938); Sims v. Strand Theatre, 29 A.2d 208, 209 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1942).
135Compare Haley v. May Dept. Stores Co., 287 S.W.2d 366, 368 (Mo. Ct. App. 1956) ("But even
if the crowd did become unruly after plaintiff boarded the escalator, defendant cannot be held to have
been negligent in failing to anticipate such conduct."), with Rotz v. City of New York, 143 A.D.2d 301,
304 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) ("Our point of departure with the IAS Court is its summary determination
that the danger here was not foreseeable.").
136 Compare Rotz, 143 A.D.2d at 303-04 (explaining that the lower court found that acts of
individual crowd members were intervening, superseding causes of plaintiffs crowd crush injuries), with
Myers, 73 S.W.2d at 321 ("The plaintiffs testimony, in its entirety, is not open to the construction that
she was pushed over the rope, not by the pressure of the crowd, but merely by one or two persons who
began pushing in an effort to get next to the door into the theater or auditorium proper. But even if the
pressure against plaintiff was by the pushing of two or more, yet if that was the result of the pressure of
the congested crowd in the roped-off space, it would not exculpate defendant, since those coming
directly in contact with plaintiff under those circumstances could be regarded as merely an intervening,
though not an independent, cause.").
137Compare Klish, 109 P.2d at 76 ("Crowds are common at theaters and other places of amusement.
That there may be some jostling in such crowds is inevitable. That someone may fall and sustain injury,
or cause injury to others, always is a possibility. These conditions are so common that those who attend
such places are presumed to know of them."), with Rossman v. K Mart Corp., 701 F. Supp. 1127, 1132
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provides extremely dear and straightforward answers to these questions in most
cases and yet, as noted above, this body of science has been almost entirely
overlooked by courts in the United States.
In this section, after providing a brief overview of the underlying torts issues in
crowd crush cases, I highlight several of the issues on which courts are currently
split, identify a number of scientific errors that courts have consistently made in
crowd crush cases, and demonstrate how crowd science can provide definitive
answers to some of the issues with which courts struggle.
A. An Overview ofNegligence Claims
"Crowd crush cases are grounded in basic tort law" 3 and are virtually always
centered on negligence daims.1 39 Defendants may include the owner and operator
of the venue in which the crowd crush injury occurred, the promoter or producer of
any event occurring on the premises at the time, the security company on duty
during the incident, and/or the performer on stage if the injury occurred during a
concert or festival. 141 Plaintiffs, in turn, must prove that 'they are in the class of
people to whom any defendant has a duty of care; that defendant breached its duty,
that there is a causal link unbroken141by a third party in the crowd; and that the
[plaintiffs] were harmed as a result."
An examination of each of these elements reveals both important trends in
crowd crush litigation and analytical mistakes that courts in these cases have made
repeatedly.

B. Duty
Duty is usually fairly easy for plaintiffs to establish in crowd crush cases. Under
'traditional premises liability law," those who enter venues as paying customers or
audience members (e.g. concertgoers, sports spectators, etc.) are considered invitees

to whom a duty of a reasonable care is owed:
The venue owner and operator have a duty to provide reasonably safe means of
ingress and egress, a duty to use ordinary care to keep the premises safe, a duty to

(M.D. Pa.), afid, 866 F.2d 1413 (3d Cit. 1988) ("While Mrs. Rossman became part of a crowd that
ultimately became testy and unruly, there is no evidence that she subjectively knew that K Mart
Corporation would fail to take proper precautions to control the crowd, or to provide a reasonably safe
method for distribution of the dolls. Nor could Mrs. Rossman have anticipated that K Mart employees
would take actions that would cause the unruly crowd to stampede.").
s3s Adelman, supra note 22, at 19.
3 FRUMER &FRIEDMAN,

supranote 124.

4 Adelman, supra note 22, at 20.
141
id.at 19.
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discover and correct or warn of any dangerous conditions and a duty to protect
attendees from negligent activities.1

For these reasons, venues bear dual burdens for crowd safety: they are liable for
"[(1)] any injuries caused by a hazard the venue itself creates and [(2)] for
negligently failing to remove a hazard created by others, once [they have] either
express or implied notice of the hazard." 43
Because plaintiffs in crowd crush cases were almost always dearly invitees of the
defendant(s) during crowd crush incidents, duty has virtually never been a
significant source of contention in crowd crush litigation. The few cases in which
duty has been an issue are those in which plaintiffs have sued performers or
promoters rather than (or not merely in addition to) the owners and operators of
the venue. In Pooser v. Cox Radio, Inc., for instance, the plaintiff sued a radio
station after sustaining a head injury in a standing-room-only section of a
concert.' 4 The radio station had merely promoted the concert and lacked control
45
over the amphitheater, the seating arrangements, or the amphitheater's security.1
The lower court granted the radio station's motion for146summary judgment, holding
that the radio station did not owe the plaintiff a duty.
However, in Cunningbam v. D.C. Sports & Entertainment Commission, the case
arising out of the Eminem concert injury discussed above, the plaintiff sued, among
other defendants, the performer, Marshall Mathers (a.k.a. Eminem), and his
touring company. 147 Mathers and company responded with a motion for summary
judgment arguing (1) that they did not owe a duty to the plaintiff because Mathers
"did nothing more than take the stage to perform" and (2) that Mathers' touring
company "was not involved with crowd control or management."14 The court
disagreed.' 49 The plaintiff "offered evidence that the Mathers defendants failed to
stop the performance until more than five minutes after the [crowd crush] incident
in question was apparent. " i s° This failure, in the court's view, created an
"unreasonable risk of harm" that was "sufficient to establish a duty between a
151
performer or touring company and a concertgoer."

142

LIND ET AL., supra note 106; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 344 (AM. LAW

INST. 1965).
143 Adelman, supra note 22, at 20.
144Pooser v. Cox Radio, Inc., No. 04-08-00270-CV, 2009 WL 200449, at *1 (Tex. Ct. App. Jan.
28,2009).

145See i.

at *2-3.

4

1 6 Id. at*1.

147 Cunningham v. D.C. Sports & Entm't Comm'n, No. CivA.03-839RWRJMF, 2005 WL
3276306, at "1-3 (D.D.C. Nov. 30, 2005).
148 Id. at *6.
149 Id. at *7.
15°Id. at *6.
151Id.
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It bears repeating, however, that both Pooser and Cunningham are unique within
reported crowd crush cases for containing such extensive discussions of duty. As
discussed, when the primary defendant in a crowd crush case is, as it usually is, the
owner or operator of the facility or venue in which the injury occurred, duty is
virtually never an issue. When, as in Pooser or Cunningham, the defendant is
another type of entity, the duty issue may be thornier, although certainly not a fatal
blow to a plaintiffs case. Indeed, as one scholar notes, "[t]here is no categorical bar
against imposing a duty on a singer to a concertgoer," and if the Cunningham
decision is of any indication, the modern trend may be towards finding a duty fairly
readily in cases where a performer is aware of a burgeoning crowd crush incident
but does not intervene.

152

C. Breach

Once duty has been established, plaintiffs must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the defendant(s) breached their duty of care. In a premises liability
scenario where the plaintiff is an invitee of the defendant(s) (as in most crowd
crush cases), proving breach entails demonstrating that the defendant(s) failed to
exercise reasonable care in eliminating both known hazards and hazards that were
unknown but could have been discovered through reasonable inquiry.153 In crowd
crush cases, plaintiffs may attempt to satisfy this element of their claim by proving
that defendant(s) failed to "guard customers, patrons, and other invitees from injury
by either a crowd or one of its members through the use of ushers, guards, or other
54
attendants, or by means of physical devices such as barricades, ropes, or railings."'
They may also attempt to show that the defendants breached their duty of care by
failing to keep multiple entrances and exits open, eliminate bottlenecks, use
reserved rather than festival or general admission seating arrangements, or employ
one or more of the other forms of crowd control discussed below.
While crowd science arguably demonstrates quite clearly what reasonable care
entails in crowd management situations, courts analyzing crowd crush cases have
made a number of analytical errors in assessing breach.'l 5 Two errors, in particular,
are worth highlighting.
1. MisplacedReliance on Capacity Numbers-Courts (and investigators of crowd

crush disasters) often err when conducting breach analyses in crowd crush cases by
relying on maximum capacity numbers in determining whether defendants
breached their duty of care by allowing a venue to become unreasonably

152

Adelman, supra note 22, at 20.
Id. at 20.

& FRIEDMAN, supra note 124.
infra text accompanying notes 156-97.

154 FRUMER

155See
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overcrowded. 5 6 For example, in Lazarus v. Skouras Theatres Corp., the plaintiff was
injured when she collided with another patron in the inner lobby of a movie
theater.1 57 The court unanimously reversed a judgment for the plaintiff in a oneparagraph decision, noting that "the highest estimate given during the trial, one
" l5 8
that was patently excessive, was that the theatre was filled to half its capacity.
The court found that the fact that the theater had not been filled to its official
capacity meant that the lobby could not have been "dangerously crowded," and thus
that the defendant had not been negligent. 59 Similarly, in Schwartz v. Madison
Square Garden Corp., the court found that there was no evidence of breach in a
crowd crush case because the records of the defendant showed that the balcony of
Madison Square Garden, where the injury had occurred, "had a maximum capacity
of 5,867 persons," and on the day that the plaintiff was injured "had 761 under the
160
maximum."
At first glance, there is an appealing logic to these decisions. If the maximum
capacity for a concert hall is 500 people, it seems to follow that if the hall only
contains 300 people, a crowd crush is unlikely to occur. Further, it also seems
logical that the owners or managers of the concert hall would be reasonable (and
thus not negligent) in allowing anything up to 500 people enter their venue. This is
6
the rationale that courts seem to be relying on in these decisions.' 1
This logic is fundamentally flawed, however, because it relies on a faulty
assumption: that individuals within a venue evenly distribute themselves
throughout the space such that a crowd below the capacity of a venue could not
reach a high-risk density. This assumption is flawed for two reasons. First, as
discussed above, individuals rarely distribute themselves evenly throughout a given
space.' 62 Instead, crowds tend to push forward and assemble tightly around
locations of value within a venue, like the main stage, restrooms, or concession
stands. 163 Thus, high-risk crowd densities can-and often do--develop within a
smaller area of a given venue even though the venue, as a whole, is under its

e.g., Lazarus v. Skouras Theatres Corp., 11 A.D.2d 680, 680 (N.Y. App. Div. 1960);
Schwartz v. Madison Square Garden Corp., 283 A.D. 385, 387 (N.Y. App. Div. 1954), rev 4 123
N.E.2d 573 (N.Y. 1954); Prettyman v. Trenton Transp. Co., 73 Pa. Super. 353, 356 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1920).
157Lazarus, 11 A.D.2d at 680.
156 See,

158id.

159See id.

160Schwartz, 283 A.D. at 387. Notably, this decision was reversed and remanded, the appellate

court finding that there were enough facts presented to permit a finding of liability by a jury. Schwartz v.
Madison Square Garden Corp., 123 N.E.2d 573, 573 (N.Y. 1954).
161See Lazarus, 11 A.D.2d at 680; Schwartz, 283 A.D. at 387; Prettyman, 73 Pa. Super. at 356; see
also MOLLEN, supra note 69, at 62.
162See supra text accompanying notes 106-08.
163See e.g., Custini v. Radio City Prods., LLC, No. 604084/2006, slip op. at 2-4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.,

July 27, 2009); LIND ET AL., supra note 106.
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maximum capacity at the time. 16 There appears to be only one crowd crush case on
record in the United States where a court has understood this principle and applied
16
it correctly.
In Custini v. Radio City Productions,LLC, the plaintiff and several of her family
members went to Radio City Music Hall to attend a show.' 66 Approximately ten
minutes after the show was scheduled to begin, managers of the Hall announced to
the audience that the show was postponed due to a musician union's strike and
asked audience members to leave.1 67 Even though plaintiff and her family members
remained in their seats for several minutes after the announcement, they became
immersed in a dense crowd within the inner lobby of the venue when they finally
emerged from the concert hall.168 The plaintiff testified that large numbers of
people were gathered around the concession stands attempting to return items that
they had bought for the now-cancelled show.169 While trying to exit the Hall,
plaintiff was pushed by the forces of the crowd, fell down, and had her legs
trampled.

1 70

In the resulting litigation, Radio City Music Hall argued, among other things,
that it had not breached its duty of care because the Hall had been only
approximately sixty percent full during the incident in question and thus could not
have been overcrowded.17 ' The court rejected this argument and correctly noted:
[T]he question that arises from the testimony of plaintiff and her son is not
whether the Music Hall, as a whole, was overcrowded, but whether the area
aroundthe concession standwas dangerously overcrowded and chaotic as a result of
defendant's decision to cancel the show when it did, and whether defendants
failed to adequately control the people that were seeking to return their purchases
to the concession stand or exit. 72

This analysis is sound because the court does not rely on the misguided
assumption that crowd members within the Hall evenly distributed themselves
throughout the venue, but rather recognizes that individual areas within the larger
venue could have become dangerously crowded even when the venue itself was
under capacity. 173 Unfortunately, as mentioned, this case appears to be the only one
in which a U.S. court has demonstrated a dear understanding of this principle.
64 This was precisely the situation during the crowd crush at the 2002 Eminem concert discussed

above. See White, supra note 107. RFK Stadium has a maximum capacity of approximately 50,000
people but only "20,000 to 30,000 were present during the incident." Id.
5 Custini, slip op. at 3-4.
'66Id. at 1.
167id.

168Id. at

2.

69

1 Id.
0 Id. at 3.
7I Id. at 4.
72
1 Id. (emphasis added).
173See

id. at 7.
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Second, courts err when they rely on maximum capacity numbers because highrisk crowd densities can emerge in under-capacity crowds when crowds are forced
to negotiate bottlenecks within a given space.174 This scenario is precisely what
occurred during a November 2013 country music festival in County Tyrone,
Ireland. 75 Even though the venue was below its maximum capacity, an estimated
sixty to seventy percent of the total crowd arrived within a forty-five minute period
and had to move through a narrow entryway and courtyard. 76 Dozens of people
were crushed or trampled in the ensuing efforts of the crowd to negotiate these
1 77
spaces and enter the main music hall.
One crowd expert explains why set maximum capacity numbers do not
necessarily protect against crowd crushes in bottleneck situations:
Architects and engineers typically give minimal attention to the movement of

people in initial building design, beyond compliance with local building codes ...
. Designing for crowd management requires that projected maximum occupancy
levels of a space be correlated with the movement
capabilities of all corridors,
1 78
stairs, ramps, escalators, and other facilities.

Designing venues around crowd management principles, however, rarely occurs,
leading to the types of crowd crush incidents described above.
Thus, capacity numbers are of exceedingly little value in assessing whether a set
of defendants breached their duty of care by allowing a given venue to become
dangerously overcrowded. At best, capacity numbers are a weak stand-in for the
more relevant inquiry-the density of the crowd at the moment of the plaintiffs
injuries-and only then in extreme scenarios in which official capacity numbers
have been grossly exceeded. In such scenarios, a gross violation of official capacity
numbers may strongly point to the existence of a high crowd density. 179 As
discussed above, however, the inverse of that statement is not also true: compliance
with official capacity numbers does
not mean that a crowd within given value
s°
cannot reach a high-risk density.
174See Fruin, Crowd Dynamics, supra note 45.

175PromoterPledges to Review Safety After Concert Goers Hurt at Music Festival,ULSTER HERALD

(Nov. 4, 2013), http://ulsterherad.com/2013/11/04/promoter-pledges-to-review-safety-after-concertgoers-hurt-at-music-festival/#sthash.nBB8LpFt.dpuf [hereinafter PromoterPledges to Review Safety]; see
also Complaints of 'Crusb' at Fintona Country Music Concert, BBC NEWS (Nov. 4, 2013),
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-foyle-west-24801333 [hereinafter Complaints of'Crush]
(describing the incident as a "bottleneck").
176PromoterPledges to Review, supra note 175.
177See Complaintsof'Crush, supra note 175.
171Fruin, Causes and Prevention,supra note 31, at 8.
179 For instance, with regard to the E2 crowd crush, discussed in the opening of this paper, the
official capacity of the club was 240 people and yet 1,152 people were present during the incident.
Herman, supra note 12, at 9. The fact that the dub was over five times above its official capacity is
strongly indicative of the fact
that the density of the crowd was extremely high during the incident.
" See Custini v. Radio City Prods., LLC, No. 604084/2006, slip op. at 4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., July 27,
2009).
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2. Misplaced Reliance on Building Code Compliance-For virtually identical
reasons, courts would err if they held that the defendants in a crowd crush did not
breach their duty of care because their venues complied with state and local
building codes. This error seems to be less prevalent than capacity errors in crowd
crush jurisprudence, although at least one court has started down this line of
analysis.1 8 l In Prettyman v. Trenton Transportation Co., the plaintiff was knocked
unconscious when a large crowd attempted to cross a wharf and board an excursion
boat on the Delaware River.1" 2 In reversing the lower court's judgment and holding
for the defendant steamboat company, the court noted:
The boat was licensed to carry 1,100 persons, and there were 931 passengers that
evening from the park to Philadelphia. The approach from the pier or landing
wharf to the boat was by a gangplank 4 feet wide, 15 feet long, and the sides were
protected by white oak handrails 2 by 2 1/2 inches. There was no intimation of
defective construction of the pier, gangplank or boat, nor of inadequate
accommodations for a crowd of the size described in the testimony .... There
was nothing to indicate that the wharf was unsafe .... The gangplank was of
ample proportion and was of the size and style then in use on all river excursion
boats."'

The court implied that the defendant did not breach its duty of due care
because the physical facilities around which the crowd crush occurred were properly
and "adequately" constructed. 18 4 This reasoning, however, is dearly a non sequiturin
light of the scientific principles discussed above. A venue may be constructed in
accordance with state and local building codes and standards but still contain
bottlenecks or other space arrangement deficiencies that only arise when large
numbers of people attempt to utilize the space.185 As one scholar explains, "Code
a building will function well during normal
compliance does not guarantee that
186
assembly use or emergency egress."
An October 1993 crowd crush at Camp Randall Stadium in Madison,
Wisconsin, highlights the limited relevance of building code compliance in
assessing breach. On October 30, 1993, the University of Wisconsin football team
defeated its longtime conference opponent, the University of Michigan, before a
sell-out crowd of 77,745 spectators and became a possible Rose Bowl contender for

...
See Prettyman v. Trenton Transp. Co., 73 Pa. Super. 353, 356 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1920).
82Id. at 355-56.
183Id. at 356-57.
360.
Fruin, Causes andPrevention, supra note 31, at 8.

184Id. at
5
1

96 Id.
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that season.' 8 7 That victory prompted the crowd crush disaster that came next. The
New York Times reported:
As the game ended, thousands of jubilant spectators in the Wisconsin student
sections behind one of the end zones began pouring out of the stands, where they
confronted a chain-link fence designed to keep fans off the playing field. The
fence was only several feet high, and the students could have easily vaulted it if
they were not held back by security officers and Madison police. But because the
students were initially restrained behind the fence, a crush began to build up that
rippled back into the stands.'

By the end of the crowd crush, the force of which twisted metal railings and
bent fences, three people were critically injured, five were seriously hurt, and more
than seventy people were taken to the hospital." 9
The post-crush investigation assessed, among other issues, whether the stadium
complied with relevant building codes." 9 The investigation revealed that the
stadium was inspected by the Madison Fire Department twice a year and had been
inspected three months prior to the crowd crush.' 9' That inspection revealed only
minor violations relating to blocked aisles within the stadium's interior, violations
that seemingly had little to do with the incident.' 92 A court would err, however, if
it concluded from the lack of major violations that the stadium owners could not
possibly have breached their duty of care with regard to crowd control because their
facility complied with relevant building codes. Indeed, the two have little to do
with one another. The biannual inspections of the stadium were conducted 'when
the facility was empty" and were based on building code requirements that had
been written in the 1970s. 193 Little or no attention to crowd management issues
seems to have been paid by the inspectors even though there were physical
characteristics of the facility that should have raised crowd-injury concerns: "the
stadium's egress (exiting direction) capabilities were poor. While there were four
exits, only two exits were available for fans to use and those exits were a mere eight
feet and nine and a half feet in width."' 94
The code compliance of Camp Randall stadium thus had little bearing on
whether the stadium's owners had taken reasonable precautions to prevent crowd
injuries at their facility. As two legal scholars assert, even if there badbeen small or
1'7 Schuster, supra note 26; Wisconsin Victory Celebration Turns Dangerous, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31,
1993),
http'//www.nytimes.com/1993/10/31/sports/college-football-wisconsin-victory-celebrationturns-dangerous.html.
188 Wisconsin Victory Celebration Turns Dangerous,supra note 187.

189 Fried & Metchick, supra note 30, at 140; Wisconsin Victory Celebration Turns Dangerous, supra
note 187.
19 See Fried &Metchick, supra note 30, at 147.
191Id.
192 Id.

'9' See id. at 146-47.
194See id.at 146.
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even moderate building code violations at the stadium, "any possible code violation
would be only a minor issue when a crowd is surging uncontrollably down the
stands."195 With a sold-out crowd of well over 75,000 people, reasonable crowd
management at Camp Randall stadium arguably demanded significantly more than
mere compliance with building codes. 196 Indeed, after the October 1993 crowd
crush, the university made a number of changes to the stadium and to its crowd
management plans in order to reduce the likelihood of another incident. 197 These
changes included increasing the number of security personnel stationed in the
student sections during the game, better controlling "fan migration from other
areas of the stadium into the student section," increasing the number of speakers
within the student section, constructing "5 more gates with fixed release exits ... to
the chainallow for potential crowd surges to be released quicker," and redesigning
198
link fence between the field and the spectators "to avoid trapping fans."
D. Causation
Once a plaintiff has established both duty and breach, he or she must prove
both direct ("but for") and proximate causation. 1" Direct causation does not appear
to be a significant issue in crowd injury cases; extensive searching does not yield a
single case in which this element has been a point of contention between the
parties. Debate about proximate causation, however, is not only common in these
cases, it is often the centerpiece of the dispute.2° ° As one scholar notes, questions
about the foreseeability of the harm tend to be the linchpin of crowd crush
litigation. 20 1 If the plaintiff is unable to prove that her crowd crush injuries were
for
foreseeable, her claim will necessarily fail because "a proprietor is not liable
22
injuries caused by the acts of patrons which were not reasonably foreseeable."
As with the breach element of negligence, courts here again make problematic
errors of analysis. Two errors, in particular, are noteworthy.
1. Crowd Demographicsas a Red Herring-Bothcourts and venue owners often
place great significance on the demographic characteristics of crowds, insinuating
195Id. at 147.
196

This was also true, I would assert, at the City University of New York during the celebrity

basketball game crowd crush discussed above. There, after the incident, investigators determined that
the stairwell on which the crowd crush occurred was "constructed within code provisions" but dearly
failed from a crowd management perspective. See MOLLEN, supra note 69, at 23-24.
197 See Fried &Metchick, supra note 30, at 162-63.
191
199

Id. at 163.
See C.T. Drechsler, Annotation, Liability of Proprietorfor Injury to Customer or Patron CausedBy

Pushing,Crowding etc. of Other Patrons,20 A.L.R.2d 8, 86 (1952).

2'o See Adelman, supra note 22, at 19 ("Crowd crush cases are grounded in basic tort law, especially
the foreseeability of harm.").
201See id. at 18-19.
102FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 124.
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that those demographics have a strong relationship to the foreseeability of crowd
crush injuries. 20 3 One concert industry insider, for instance, defended the band U2's
use of festival seating by arguing that U2 fans, unlike the fans of other rock bands,
were capable of coping with such an arrangement safely: "Ifthere is a band that can
pull off festival seating safely, it is U2. Their crowd isn't going to be as volatile as,
say, a Red Hot Chili Peppers crowd."20 4 Similarly, after the 1979 The Who crowd
crush, experts were quick to point to the youth of the crowd members, their
"hedonistic attributes," and their susceptibility to the "hypnotic effects" of rock 'n
roll music as having heightened the risk of injuries occurring and "exaggerated the
usual crowd effects." 20 5 Courts have also considered demographics in analyzing the
foreseeability of crowd injuries, although a bit more subtly. 2°6
In Heenan v. Comcast Spectacor & Spectrum Arena Ltd. Partnership,the court was
tasked with reviewing a jury decision that found venue owners liable for crowd
crush injuries that occurred at a Philadelphia arena after a Guns N' Roses concert
was unexpectedly cancelled after the crowd had already been seated. As the plaintiff
attempted to exit the arena after the cancellation, "the crowd grew dense around
2 °7
her," and, in the resulting confusion, she fell and sustained a number of injuries.
In assessing whether the jury could have reasonably found that plaintiffs injuries
were foreseeable, the court noted that it was not merely a dense crowd during the
relevant incident, it was a crowd of "nearly 14,000 Guns N' Roses fans, all
disappointed, some angry and some violent."2°8 While the court did not explicitly
state what was to be inferred from the fact that the crowd members were Guns N'
Roses fans, it noted later in the opinion that this was a "hard rock crowd which
required additional security even under normal circumstances" and thus that venue
owners had advance warning that "this particular crowd could be problematic."2 9
The court concluded by affirming the trial court's order entering judgment for the
210
plaintiff.
In Prettyman, however, the court used the demographic characteristics of crowd
members to reach the opposite conclusion about the foreseeability of the crowd
crush injuries.
The court thought that it was significant that the crowd was
203 See Phoenix Amusement Co. v. White, 208 S.W.2d 64, 66 (Ky. 1948); Prettyman v. Trenton
Transp. Co., 73 Pa. Super. 353, 358 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1920); Heenan v. Comcast Spectacor & Spectrum
Arena Ltd. P'ship., No. 00980, 2006 Phila. Ct. Com. P1. LEXIS 138, *10 (Pa. C.P. Mar. 6, 2006),
affd, 915 A.2d 155 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006); Adelman, supra note 22, at 19.
231Adelman, supra note 22, at 19.
2 5

" Johnson, supra note 67, at 362, 371.

o See, e.g., Phoenix Amusement Co., 208 S.W.2d at 66; Pretyman, 73 Pa. Super. at 358; Heenan,
2006207Phila. Ct. Com. P1. LEXS at "10.

Id. at *4.
2"5 Id. at "15 (emphasis added); see also id. at *16-17 (again noting that the crowd was composed of
"14,000 Guns N' Roses fans").

20 Id. at *10, "19.
Id. at *30.
21 See Prettyman, 73 Pa. Super. at 358.
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primarily composed of three church groups who had rented the excursion boats for
a church picnic:
The fact that it was a picnic conducted under church influence, would certainly
not indicate that such a disturbance would be likely to occur, or that the
defendant company should be put on notice of any unusual demonstration of
force and lawlessness. This part of the crowd was law-abiding and orderly... 212

The court went on to note that "the sole cause of the disturbance was from other
visitors in the park who had no right to get on the boat."2 13 The court described
these "others" as "colored people, who were visitors at the park, but not of the
excursion party" and who had apparently forced themselves onto the boat prior to
the crush.214 The court thus implicitly found that (a) it was entirely unforeseeable
that a crowd crush could occur amongst white churchgoers, but (b) that perhaps it
could have been foreseeable that a crowd crush could occur among AfricanAmericans causing a "false clamor," but that (c) the injuries here were still
unforeseeable because the African-Americans were "intruders" rather than paying
215
guests.
However, courts err when they look to the demographic characteristics of
crowd members in assessing the foreseeability of crowd crush injuries because this
type of analysis is scientifically unsound. While demographic data may be relevant
in assessing the foreseeability of public order injuries-injuries arising from fights
that break out among crowd members, drunken behavior, rioting, etc.demographic data is decidedly irrelevant when assessing the foreseeability of
injuries that occur when crowds reach high-risk densities. This is precisely the
mistake that the court made in Heenan: conflating the likelihood of a fight breaking
out among a hard rock crowd (in which demographics are certainly relevant) with
the likelihood of a crush incident (in which they decidedly are not).216 In fact,
ironically, the fact that a crowd crush has occurred almost necessarily means that
the demographics of the crowd members are no longer relevant. One scientist
explains:
At even higher densities . .. the interaction forces in the crowd add up [and]
intentional movements of pedestrians are replaced by unintentional ones. Hence,
the well-coordinated motion among pedestrians suddenly breaks down,
particularly around bottlenecks .... This breakdown results in largely fluctuating
and uncontrollable patterns of motion, called crowd turbulence .... The related,

212
213

id.
Id. (emphasis added).
214d. at 355-56.
215See id.at 356-58.
216Heenan v. Comcast Spectatcor & Spectrum Arena Ltd. P'ship., 2006 Phila. Ct. Corn. PI.
LEXIS 138, at *10 (Pa C. P.), affd, 915 A.2d 155 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006).
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earthquakeunbalanced pressure distribution results in sudden stress releases and 217
like mass displacements of many pedestrians in all possible directions.

Another states more simply, "[c]rowds create equality.""' As explained above,
of
one of the hallmarks of a crowd crush is that the crowd as a whole takes on a life 219
its own and individual crowd members lose control over their own movements.
When crowds reach such states, scientists have found that crowd behavior is "best
describe[d] and predict[ed]" by the principles of fluid dynamics rather than the
behavior of individual crowd members. 220 Indeed, scientists have noted that the
only demographic characteristics of crowd members that have any bearing on the
foreseeability of a crowd crush incident are (a) the physical size of the crowd
members themselves and/or (b) whether crowd members are wearing bulky
clothing. 221 A crowd of larger or more heavily dressed individuals will reach a highrisk density at fewer people per square meter than a crowd of smaller or more
222
lightly dressed individuals.
In crowd crush scenarios, therefore, it matters little whether the crowd
members are Guns N' Roses fans or U2 fans, churchgoers or atheists, or rock 'n roll
aficionados or classical music lovers. Since the crowd members themselves have
virtually no ability to control either their own movements or the movements of the
individuals around them once the crowd reaches a high-risk density, crowd
demographics are almost entirely irrelevant, at least for purposes of determining
whether a crowd crush was foreseeable. Instead, courts should focus on the
scientific causes of crowd crush when conducting these inquiries into foreseeability:
bottlenecks within the venue, the use of festival seating, and other aspects of the
physical environment of a given venue that had the tendency to increase crowd
density. When such features are present in a given space, particularly one in which
large numbers of people must move over a relatively short period of time, the
potential for crowd crush is foreseeable from a scientific perspective and thus
should be from a legal one as well.
Notably, these same demographic judgments on the part of venue owners,
managers, and security officers may actually increase the likelihood of crowd crush
injuries and deaths. Such a phenomenon has occurred at least several times in
recent decades with catastrophic results. In 1989, for instance, ninety-six people
died in a crowd crush that occurred during a soccer match at the Hillsborough
stadium in Sheffield, England. 223 Immediately prior to the start of the match, over

217

Moussaid et al., supra note 46, at 6886.

21 PETER E. TARLOW, EVENT RISK MANAGEMENT AND SAFETY 90 (2002).
2 19

221
221

[d.; Adelman, supra note 22, at 19; Fruin, Causes and Prevention, supra note 31, at 4.
Pin et al., supra note 58, at 287.
Lee & Hughes, supra note 46, at 579.

222 id.
223
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5,000 fans of the Liverpool team were crowded outside of their designated entrance
into the stadium. 224 Concerned that the outside crowd had become unmanageable,
an official ordered the exit gates to be opened to allow for easier entry into the
stadium. 225 Thousands of fans streamed through the now-opened gates, through a
tunnel, and into two, already crowded, standing-room-only pens. 226 As these fans
pushed into the pens from the back, crowd members at the front of the pens were
2 27
pressed with great force up against the barrier between the pens and the pitch.
Evidence shows that, even though the fans at the front were dearly in great
distress, police officers on the scene were so concerned about "hooliganism" on the
part of crowd members "that alternative explanations for observed crowd behaviors
were not considered." 22s Two scholars observe: 'prior assumptions about antisocial
behavior led police to ignore fans' cries for help. Similarly, when fans were seen
climbing the perimeter fences to escape the crushing, it was assumed they were
invading the pitch and so perimeter gates were not opened."229 Essentially,
assumptions about the likelihood of this type of fan to cause "trouble" led officials
to ignore otherwise dear and troubling signs of a crowd crush and to make
misguided decisions that ultimately exacerbated the disaster." 0 Misguided
decision-making also occurred during The Who concert disaster with similarly bad
results:
Although most patrons who were interviewed [after the crowd crush] defined the
efforts to get through the doors as flights to safety, police officers and security
guards continued to see them as gate-crashing efforts after the surge had begun.
For instance, two officers reported trying to secure a door . . . forced open by
gate-crashers ... but a 27-year-old male patron described in detail how the door
was opened from the inside by two men trying to prevent injury to "two young
girls [who] had been banging on that door for 20 minutes" . . . . Similarly, a
couple referred to a friend who, once inside, tried to shove open some more doors
with his foot and immediately two ushers came up, one of them grabbed him,
shoved him back in line and told him to either get in line or get back out. He
then began to beg and plead with the usher, he said, "people are getting hurt,
people were down...."31

Courts, venue owners, event planners, and law enforcement forces alike should
learn from these incidents and reject the popular yet problematic assumption that
the demographics of crowd members provide useful information about the
224Taylor, supra note 69, at 11.
225Id. at 11-12.
226Id. at

12-13.

221Id. at 13.
22'

Rose Challenger & Chris W. Clegg, Crowd Disasters:.A Socio-Tecbnical Systems Perspective, 6

CONTEMPORARY SOC. Sci. 343,348-49 (2011).
229Id. at 349.
230 See id. at 348-49.
' Johnson, supra note 67, at 369-70.
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likelihood of a crowd incident occurring. Because this assumption is scientifically
flawed, it is neither legally relevant nor helpful in reducing the likelihood of crowd
crushes. In fact, as just discussed, it may actually heighten the risk of injury and
death in precarious situations.
2. Errors in Intervening, Superseding Cause Analysis-Many courts have also
made a second error in assessing causation in crowd crush cases: they find that the
movements of the crowd members themselves are--or at least could beintervening, superseding causes of plaintiffs' injuries, thus defeating a finding of
proximate causation. 23 2 Defendants raise this argument frequently in crowd crush
cases, 23 3 asserting that the acts of "the extraordinarily rude crowd... intervened to
create the dangerous circumstances" independently of the acts or omissions of the
defendants. 234 Thus, they conclude, the crowd crush was unforeseeable, arguing
235
that this breaks the chain of causation.
Use of this defense--and courts' acceptance of it-is not particularly surprising
in light of how both the American media and the general public commonly react
after a crowd crush has occurred: by blaming the crowd members themselves for
the incident and painting them as "barbarians,"236 "thugs,"237 or "animals."23 s After
The Who concert disaster, for example, a "leading national columnist" referred to
the crowd members as "barbarians" who "stomped 11 persons to death .

.

. [after

h]aving numbed their brains on weeds, chemicals, and Southern Comfort. " 239
More recently, after the now-infamous November 2008 Black Friday crowd crush
that occurred at a Long Island, New York, Wal-Mart, killing one individual and
injuring four others, crowd members were described as 'savages" who had behaved
badly. 2 ° Even government officials have joined in the crowd-blaming act: the City
of New York's official review of the City College crowd crush discussed above
232See FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 124 ("[I]f the defendant is negligent, the movement of
the crowd cannot be held as a matter of law to be an independent superseding force which relieves the
defendant from liability for misconduct. In practice, however, most panic cases have been decided in
favor of the proprietor, usually because the crowd's actions were not reasonably foreseeable or because

the defendant was not negligent."); see also Rotz v. New York, 143 A.D.2d 301, 306 (N.Y. App. Div.
1988); Glatfelter v. Delta Air Lines, 558 S.E2d 793, 796-97 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002).
3 Robert S. Kelner & Gail S. Kelner, Crowds, Violence, and Tort Liability, KELNER & KELNER,
http://www.kelnerlaw.com/pages/crowds-violence-and-tort-liability (last visited Oct. 16, 2015).
3 Dawson, supra note 21, at 811.
s L. Stacy Weaver, Jr., Department StoreLiability in Rush Sales, 2 DUKE BJ. 90, 90, 92-95 (1951).
236 Michael Pravica, Letter to the Editor, A Black Friday Sale Shouldn't Make Us Barbarians,N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 1, 2008), http'//www.nytimes.com/2008/12/02/opinionA102walmart.html.
" Festivus, Comment to On Long Island, Black Friday Crowd Kills Wal-Mart Employee, SI LIVE
(Nov. 29, 2008), http://www.silive.com/news/index.ssf/2008/11/ onlong-island blackfriday cr.html.
3 Berger, supra note 26, at Al, B8.
Mike Royko, Opinion, The New Barbarians:A Glimpse into theFuture,CIN. POST, Dec. 6, 1979,
at 7; see also Johnson, supra note 67, at 362.
" Robert D. McFadden & Angela Macropoulos, Wal-Mart Employee Trampled to Death, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 28, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/29/business/29walmat.html?fta=y.
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faulted, among other groups, "the spectators themselves" for "surging towards the
gymnasium doors with a total disregard for their fellow attendees and school
241
property."
Arguably the best example of the use of this type of crowd-blaming defense
comes from Rotz v. City qf New York, a case arising out of a truly strange crowd
crush incident that occurred in Central Park in 1983.242 In late July of that year,
Diana Ross held a free concert in the park. 243 A "tremendous crowd" showed up
and people were "jammed in like sardines." 2 " At some point during the
performance, a rumor rippled through the crowd that a lion was on the loose and a
large portion of the crowd attempted to flee. 24 5 The plaintiff explained that there
were shouts of "get out of the way, there's a lion, a lion" and that "everybody started
running and ... just ran on top of everybody [else]." 246 In the course of the rush,
the plaintiff was knocked down, trampled, and injured. 247 He then sued the City of
New York, the producer of the concert, and Paramount Pictures Corporation, the
248
company that held a license to create and broadcast footage of the event.

Among other defenses it raised, Paramount argued that "the precipitating cause
of the stampeding-i.e., the yelling to get out of the way because a lion was
coming-was an unforeseeable intervening event that precluded liability."24 9 The

lower court agreed and granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding that
"the danger here was not foreseeable and that, as a matter of law, the injuries to the
250
plaintiff were caused by an unforeseeable, intervening event."
Yet again, however, this type of defense (and court acceptance thereof), runs
contrary to the basic tenets of crowd science and for virtually the same reasons
discussed in the section above. This defense, by necessity, relies on an assumption
that the intervening, superseding movements of the crowd were volitional. Indeed,
if the defense were not premised on this assumption, it would fail as a matter of
law. As one legal scholar aptly explains:
Reflex reactions, involuntary motor movements ... and the like are all less than
wholly voluntary because they are less than wholly free. Such less than wholly
voluntary behavior is typically excused because in such cases "my freedom to have
acted otherwise was totally or partially impaired . . . ." [B]ehavior that is the
expression of such impaired freedom does not constitute an intervening cause;
after all, being totally or partially caused itself, it could not represent a fresh causal

241 Berger, supra note 26, at Al, B8.

...Rotz v. New York, 143 A.D.2d 301,301-02 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988).
243 [d.
2

4 -d. at 302.

245id.

246 I[d.
247 id.

248 id.

241Id. at 303.
'50 Id. at 304.
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start breaking causal chains. Such unfree, nonvoluntary behavior is just another
link in the causal chain, no different than other caused events. 5 '

But crowd science demonstrates that this is precisely what occurs during crowd
crush incidents:252 the movements and actions of crowd members are "unfree,
nonvoluntary behavior." 253 As explained at length above, once crowd density enters
a high-risk zone, "individual control of movement becomes impossible, and
phenomena such as shock waves will be propagated through the crowd mass and
25 4
cause the sudden uncontrolled surges that unleash the crowd's destructive force."
Thus, the lower court in Rotz committed both a legal and a scientific error in
accepting the defendant's defense that the intervening, superseding causes of the
plaintiffs injury were the acts of the crowd around him.25 5 Given that the crowd
was "Jammed in like sardines" around him, it seems virtually certain that the crowd
movements that caused his injuries were wholly involuntary on the part of
256
individual crowd members.
Fortunately, on appeal, the Supreme Court of New York, First Department,
analyzed this issue correctly:
In the instant case[,] the inquiry as to what risks were reasonably to be perceived
must be framed in terms of what risks or dangers should reasonably have been
anticipated by the city from the gathering of an extremely large crowd to hear a
free concert by a renowned entertainer in Central Park on a summer evening. In
light of common contemporary experience a jury could certainly find that, in the
absence of adequate supervision and control of that crowd, it was reasonably
foreseeable that disorder ... could erupt from some cause ignited by the vagaries
of myriad individuals "jammed together" in a heightened atmosphere .... A jury
here could reasonably find that the risk of a riot or a stampede could have been
averted, or its consequences contained, by adequate crowd-control measures ...
and that defendant city failed to exercise the reasonable care necessary under the
circumstances to avoid that foreseeable risk. 7

The court concluded that whether the conduct was an intervening, superseding
cause of plaintiffs injuries was a "fact question which should be resolved at a trial
and not as a matter of law on this motion for summary judgment." 25 The appellate
court's analysis of the intervening, superseding cause defense is far more accurate
'

252

Michael S. Moore, The Metaphysics of CausalIntervention,88 CAL. L. REV. 827, 867-68 (2000).
See Moussaid et al., supra note 46 at 2885 ("Indeed, at extreme densities, it is necessary to

distinguish between the intentionalavoidance behavior of pedestrians adapting their motion according
to perceived visual cues and unintentional movements resulting from interaction forces caused by
collision with other bodies.").
" Moore, supra note 251, at 868; see also Helbing, supra note 21, at 967; Adelman, supra note 22,
at 19.
24 Fruin, CrowdDynamics,supra note 45.
25 Rotz, 143 A.D.2d at 301, 304-05.
256
See id. at 302.
2 7
1 Id. at 305.
25
1 Id. at 306.
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and far less scientifically problematic.25 9 The court correctly noted that the risk
most relevant to the proximate cause inquiry in this case was the risk of a crowd
injury arising from the assembly of a highly dense crowd, not the far more narrowly
26
defined risk of a crowd stampede arising from a rumor about a lion on the loose. 0
The court explained:
The [lower] court focused solely upon the foreseeability of the exact manner in
which the disturbance was precipitated and concluded, as a matter of law, that it
was an unforeseeable intervening event which relieved defendant of liability. The
law, however, is to the contrary. "fhat defendant could not anticipate the precise
manner of the accident or the exact extent of injuries, however, does not preclude
liability as a2 61matter of law where the general risk and character of injuries are
foreseeable."

Indeed, if the plaintiffs description of the density of the crowd immediately
prior to his injuries was correct, it was highly foreseeable that a crowd-related
262
injury would occur, and thus proximate cause was clearly satisfied in that case.
This is a critical legal point in crowd crush litigation that courts often miss: from a
scientific perspective, it is absolutely foreseeable that crowd crush-related injuries
and deaths may occur when crowds reach high densities. Liability should turn on
whether the defendants (a) knew or should have known that crowds within the
relevant physical space could reach high densities, and (b) took reasonable steps to
reduce that risk. Instead, as the cases above demonstrate, courts often overlook this
analysis entirely.
E. Defenses. Assumption of the Risk

In negligence cases, "[t]he principle that one who voluntarily assumes the risk
of injury from a known danger is barred from recovery for injuries is generally
recognized,"2 63 and thus assumption of the risk is a commonly raised defense. 261 To

prove that a plaintiff assumed the risk of the injury that she suffered, the
defendant(s) must prove that the plaintiff either (a) expressly assumed the risk (for
example, by signing a waiver or release of liability) or (b) "kn[ew] of the existence
2259See id.

60Id.

261

See id. at 305-06 (citing Derdiarian v. Felix Contr. Corp., 414 N.E.2d 666, 671 (N.Y. 1980)).

262Id. at 302; Helbing, supra note 21, at 968; Lee & Hughes, supra note 46, at 581.
'

Drechsler, supranote 199, at 38.
To be fair, referring to assumption of the risk as a "defense" to negligence claims is a misnomer.

In cases where assumption of the risk applies, "the plaintiff is prevented from making out even a prima
facie case of liability." WARD FARNSWORTH & MARK F. GRADY, TORTS: CASES & QUESTIONS 596
(2d ed. 2009). The assumption of the risk doctrine thus "amounts to a way of saying that the defendant
had no duty to protect the plaintiff from the harm he has suffered, or that the defendant did not breach
whatever duty existed." Id. For purposes of this paper, assumption of the risk will be discussed in the
way that it is commonly described by legal practitioners: as a defense to a negligence claim.
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of the risk and appreciate[d] its unreasonable character" (implied assumption of the
risk). 265 Here, too, courts have made analytical errors in crowd crush cases.

1. Express Assumption qf the Risk-In crowd crush cases arising out of injuries
sustained at concerts, sporting events, or other paid performances, defendants may
raise an express assumption of the risk defense if the tickets purchased by the
plaintiff contained exculpatory language.6 While courts generally uphold waivers
made knowingly, voluntarily, and with a full appreciation for the significance of the
waiver, this type of defense is usually unsuccessful for two reasons. First, generally
speaking, "the law skeptically views a party's attempt to exculpate itself from its
own negligence," and so courts tend to closely scrutinize both the language and
location of the relevant exculpatory clause to assess whether it provided "reasonable
notice" to the plaintiff.267 This scrutiny often means "that an exculpatory clause
with no signature will likely be held unenforceable." 268
Second, "courts will invalidate express assumption of risk in cases in which it
would directly contravene public policy."269 In crowd crush cases, this could be true
where, for instance, a court finds that event promoters or organizers could have
done "something more in the way of precautions" to prevent a crowd crush from
occurring, particularly where such precautions could have been as simple and
inexpensive as opening more entrances or exit doors. 27" Accordingly, there do not
appear to be any cases in which an express assumption of the risk defense has
prevailed in a crowd crush case.
2. Implied Assumption qf the Risk-Overcoming an implied assumption of the
risk defense poses a greater obstacle to crowd crush plaintiffs. Though defendants
must prove that the plaintiff had "full knowledge and appreciation of the risk and
voluntary encountering of it,"271 a long line of cases supports the notion that
individuals who freely join a dense crowd automatically assume the risk of any
hazard that joining the crowd produces. 272 In Klish v. Alaskan Amusement Co., for
instance, the plaintiff purchased a ticket to a hockey game at a theater called the
Alaskan Ice Palace. 273 She was seated immediately adjacent to an aisle that became
"overcrowded by patrons and spectators who apparently were unable to find

265 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 496D (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
266 Ellis, supra note 35, at 614-15.
267 Id. at 617.
26

8 id.
9

26 Id. at 615.
27 See Adelman, supra note 22, at 22 (quotation omitted); see also Ellis, supra note 35, at 624 ("A
bright-line rule barring the fan from any recovery ... seems overly harsh and would further encourage
venue owners to disregard adequate measures to protect spectators.").
271Weaver, supra note 235, at 97.
272 Little v. Butner, 348 P.2d 1022, 1030 (Kan. 1960).
273Klish v. Alaskan Amusement Co., 109 P.2d 75, 75 (Kan. 1941).
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seats." 274 A concessionist attempting to sell programs in the crowded aisle was

jostled by the crowd, lost his balance, and fell, hitting and severely injuring the
plaintiff in the process. 275 In the resulting litigation, the court ruled for the
defendant, reasoning:
Crowds are common at theaters and other places of amusement. That there may
be some jostling in such crowds is inevitable. That someone may fall and sustain
injury, or cause injury to others, always is a possibility. These conditions are so
common that those who attend such places are presumed to know of them. 76

Under the court's logic, virtually any negligence claim arising out of a crowd
injury or death at an entertainment venue would fall to an assumption of the risk
defense.277 Other legal scholars have argued that this should be a bright line rule:
spectators injured by crowds at entertainment venues278are barred from recovery
"because the dangerous risks are inherent and obvious."
Such a stark view of implied assumption of the risk in a crowd crush context is
both unwarranted and problematic. Indeed, crowd science demonstrates that the
risks of crowd crush injuries are neither (a) inherent in crowds nor (b) obvious to
individuals joining a crowd, the two theories behind a successful implied
assumption of the risk defense. 7 9 First, not every crowd carries with it an inherent
danger of crowd crush injuries. As discussed above, crowds with a density of
between one and four individuals per square meter have a very low risk of crowd
crush injuries associated with them. 280 To the extent that an individual is joining
lower-density crowds, that individual is not voluntarily taking on an inherent risk
28
of crowd crush injuries because such injuries are extremely unlikely to occur. 1
In this way, crowd crush cases are decidedly different than the classical realms
in which implied assumption of the risk defenses tend to prevail: cases "deal[ing]
with places of amusement or sport." 282 For example, a substantial body of case law
denies recovery to fans hurt by baseballs that fly into the stands at stadiums because
courts have concluded that "the risk of being hit by a ball is a customary part of the
sport."283 Baseball necessarily involves fast-moving projectiles that often stray from
the formal, bounded area of play, and so live baseball spectatorship virtually always
274

Id.at 75-76.
Id.at 76.

27 5

276 id.

277 See id.
27 Ellis,
supra note 35, at 624.
21 See Hubner v. Spring Valley Equestrian Ctr., 1 A.3d 618, 628 (NJ. 2010) (setting forth the

theories behind an implied assumption of the risk defense).
21 Oberhagemann, supra note 49, at 11; Lee & Hughes, supra note 46, at 576.
211 See Oberhagemann, supranote 49, at 13.
" Drechsler, supranote 199, § 38.
2" Adelman, supra note 22, at 22 (quoting Gallagher v. Cleveland Browns Football Co., 638
N.E.2d 1082, 1089 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994)).
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carries with it the possibility of harm from encountering one of them. 2 84 However,
joining a crowd does not necessarily carry with it the risk of "getting crushed ...to
the point of asphyxiation" and crowd crushes do not occur "with the frequency, or
fair warning, of getting hit by a foul ball."285 Instead, most crowds encountered by
most people most of the time are of a low enough density as to pose almost no risk
of crowd crush injury at all.
Moreover, even if all crowds did carry with them an inherent risk of crowd
crush injuries, that inherent risk alone should not bar a finding of liability in crowd
crush cases where a defendant raises an assumption of the risk defense. One scholar
explains why in the context of crowd crush injuries at concerts:
The era of modern concert injuries is relatively new. In this way, it most
resembles baseball and auto racing spectator issues of the early 1900s, when those
sports were relatively young. Early professional baseball games lacked backstops
or screens, and early auto races provided inadequate barriers to withstand the
impact of crashing cars and flying debris. Increased litigation altered the
minimum standard in each of these sports and paved the way for reasonable
screening and adequate fencing. Courts did not view injured spectators as having
assumed the risk. Instead, because these events were so inherently dangerous
without the reasonable protections, courts refused to accept the defendant's
primary assumption-of-risk defense as a bar to the plaintiffs recovery. 8"

In situations where crowds are likely to assemble, venue owners and event
managers are best positioned to reduce the likelihood of crowd injuries. 7 Indeed,
"[a]nalysis of more than a dozen serious crowd incidents has shown that in all cases
... management strategies ... could have averted or significantly reduced crowd
effects." 288 These strategies, moreover, need not be expensive or sophisticated.
Rather, crowd incident modeling and experience has shown that even "simple
advance planning" and basic crowd management techniques can drastically reduce
the likelihood of injury.289 Courts should thus treat crowd crush cases, particularly
those arising out of crowd incidents in formal entertainment or athletic venues, as
they treated professional baseball and auto racing in the early 1900s: by requiring
organizers and venue owners to take the minimal steps needed to reduce the risk of
crowd injuries and deaths rather than allowing them to hide behind implied
assumption of the risk defenses when such injuries occur.29 Ruling otherwise
284 See id.
285id.

26 Ellis, supra note 35, at 619-20.
257See Fruin, Causes and Prevention, supra note 31, at 9; see also Fruin, supra note 45 (discussing the

need for efficient crowd management).
Fruin, Crowd Dynamics, supra note 45.
259 Fruin, Causes and Prevention, supra note 31, at 9; see also Fried & Metchick, supra note 30, at
162-63 (detailing a number of inexpensive and easy ways for venue owners to have prevented the Camp
Randall Stadium crowd crush).
290 See Adelman, supra note 22, at 22 ("Yet even if concert disasters were more common and well
's

publicized, that would still not relieve organizers or performers of their duty of care. On the contrary,
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would be "overly harsh and would further encourage venue owners to disregard
adequate measures to protect [crowd members]." 29'
Second, even assuming arguendo that all crowds did carry an inherent risk of
crowd crush injuries, the risk of such injuries is not necessarily obvious, the second
element of a successful implied assumption of the risk defense. For this element to
be satisfied, defendants must show that the risk taken on by the plaintiff was
readily apparent and that plaintiffs were thus able to make an "informed choice"
about taking it on. 292 In a baseball context, for example:
[C]ourts have concluded that the risk of harm is so "open and obvious" that
anyone watching a game should know that he or she risks being hit by a ball.
Since spectators can ensure their safety by staying in the screened area behind
home plate, sitting anywhere else in the ballpark implies that the fan weighed the
odds and made an informed choice. The defendant in that scenario bears no
29 s
further duty.

The risks of crowd crush in a crowd scenario, however, are not nearly as
apparent for a number of reasons.
To start, low risk, low-density crowds may unexpectedly (from an individual
crowd member's point of view) become high risk, high-density crowds as the crowd
moves through physical space, particularly spaces that features bottlenecks. For
example, in the November 2013 crowd crush at the country music festival in
County Tyrone, Ireland, an individual that joined the crowd while still outside of
the venue (and thus likely of low density) may have had little reason to know that
that same crowd would become packed incredibly tightly and thus reach a very
high-and risky-density as it attempted to negotiate the narrow entryway and
courtyard once inside the venue. 294 Furthermore, changes in scheduled events may
come as a surprise to spectators and cause the sudden development of a high
density crowd. The plaintiffs in Custini, the case arising out of the crowd crush at
Radio City Music Hall, for instance, almost certainly had no reason to believe that
they were taking on the risk of crowd crush injuries by attending a show at that
venue.295 Such risks arose out of an unexpected event: the cancellation of the show

when the parties putting on the concert should anticipate an unreasonable risk of harm to the invitee
notwithstanding his knowledge, warning, or the obvious nature of the condition, something more in the
way of precautions may be required.").
Ellis, supra note 35, at 624.
292See Adelman, supra note 22, at 22.

293id.

294 See generally Promoter Pledges to Review Safely, supra note 175 (reporting on the 2013 crowd

crush at the country music festival in County Tyrone, Ireland); see also Complaints of'Crush',supra note
175 (detailing the concert-goers' descriptions of the 2013 crowd crush).
29 Custini v. Radio City Prods., LLC, No. 604084/2006, slip op. at 1-2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., July 27,
2009).
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and the rush of audience members to return items to the Hall's concession
6
stands.

29

Next, while the absolute number of crowd crush injuries in the United States is
troubling, from a relative perspective, the rate of crowd crush injuries is extremely
low given the frequency with which most people encounter and participate in
crowds. 297 Crowd crush injuries are also severely underreported. 9 8 Discussing the
crowd crush injuries that have arisen just out of Black Friday sales, for instance,
ones scholar notes:
The abundance of Black Friday injuries dictates that consumers are not aware of
the challenges that face them when they participate in the sale events. They do
not have the information necessary, such as numbers of reported injuries, to make
an informed decision about whether to participate. The news media reported
some incidences during the 2005 and 2006 sales event; however, by 2007, reports
of injuries were extremely limited and hard to find. . . . Thus, consumers are
unable to assume the risk because the risk has not been made dear or publicized
in a manner that suggests danger. 9

Thus, individuals confronted with a crowd at a store, a music performance, a
sporting event, or arguably in any other context in the United States, have no
3
reason to believe that they are risking crowd-related injuries or death. 00
In sum, upholding assumption of the risk defenses in crowd crush cases makes
little sense from either a legal or a policy standpoint. Crowd crush injuries are not
an inherent and obvious part of joining a crowd. Furthermore, allowing defendants
to prevail on this defense disincentivizes venue owners and event managers from
taking steps to reduce the likelihood of crowd injuries and deaths, even though
these parties are best situated to do so.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
In light of the myriad judicial errors of analysis set forth above---and the
conflicting and confusing jurisprudence that has resulted-it is worth setting forth
several recommendations for courts and practitioners tasked with handling crowd
crush litigation in the future.

296id.
17

See Adelman, supra note 22, at 22.

298E.g., Dawson, supra note 21, at 764; Ellis, supra note 35, at 608.
299Dawson, supra note 21, at 793-94.

o See id.; see also Adelman, supra note 22, at 18 ("Entering the festival seating area to get dose to
the band does not mean that the person who is injured when doing so assumes the risk of severe injury
or death.").
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A. The Importance of CrowdDensity Calculations

The logical first step in conducting a legal analysis of a crowd crush case is to
determine, if possible, the density of the crowd at the time of the plaintiffs alleged
injuries. As discussed above, crowd density is the single best predictor of crowd
crush incidents:301 crowds with densities lower than five people per square meter
have a very low likelihood of crowd-related injuries and deaths, whereas crowds
with densities of five people per square meter or more have a very high likelihood
of such harms occurring. 30 2 Accordingly, if an analysis revealed that the crowd
surrounding a plaintiff at the time of her alleged injuries was of a density below five
people per square meter, the plaintiffs resulting negligence claim would, as initial
matter, be relatively weak, and one of two possibilities would likely be true.30 3 The
first possibility would be that the plaintiffs injuries were caused by something other
than the forces of the crowd around them (i.e. her injuries were not truly crowd
crush injuries but were caused instead by something else such as a public order
disturbance or the volitional or accidental movements of another crowd member).
In such a case, the plaintiffs negligence claim would be exceedingly difficult to
prove, at least to the extent that her central assertion posited that a crowd crush
caused her injuries. Dismissal or summary judgment against the plaintiff would
almost certainly be warranted in such a case.
The second possibility would be that the density analysis itself was flawed. If,
for instance, the party conducting the analysis looked at too large a segment of the
crowd in calculating the density, the resulting number could be artificially low and
not accurately reflect the density of the crowd immediately surroundingthe plaintiff

at the moment of their alleged injuries. In Custini, for example, the evidence
suggested that the density of the crowd in the music hall as a whole was fairly low
but that the density of the crowd in the area around the concession stands (and
thus the plaintiff) was dangerously high. °4 Someone calculating the density of the
entire crowd would have generated results that would not have adequately captured
the risk of injury to the plaintiff in the moments immediately preceding her
injury.305 Similarly, if the party conducting the density analysis looked at the wrong
segment of the crowd or assessed the density of the crowd at a moment too far
removed from the plaintiffs injuries, the results would be of dubious value, as well.
However, if a density analysis revealed that the crowd surrounding the plaintiff
at the time of her alleged injuries was of a high density, the plaintiff's negligence
30"
302

See Lee &Hughes, supra note 46, at 579.
See id. at 581.

30' See id. There is one additional, significantly more remote possibility that does not warrant
extensive discussion in this piece: the possibility that the plaintiff is lying about having sustained injuries
at all.
4 See Custini v. Radio City Prods., LLC, No. 604084/2006, slip op. at 2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., July 27,
2009).
305See id.
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claim would be very strong,3°6 and attention should turn to the extent to which the
crowd crush was foreseeable by the defendant(s). 3 7 Here, evidence regarding the
defendant(s)' crowd management strategies, if any, would be highly probative, as
would evidence about the use of festival seating, prior crowd incidents at the
relevant venue, and the physical layout of the space through which the crowd was
required to move.3°8 Courts should look with a wary eye, however, upon other types
of circumstantial evidence on this issue: the demographics of the crowd,
compliance with the official capacity for the venue, and compliance with building
codes, as discussed at greater length above.
Calculating the relevant crowd density at the moment of a plaintiffs alleged
injuries is likely to be challenging in most crowd crush cases. However, courts
should recognize two possible ways of doing so. First, many crowd science experts
use scientific modeling techniques to calculate crowd density based on available
information about the relevant incident. 3°9 One highly regarded crowd science
expert (and experienced expert witness), for example, uses such mathematic
modeling techniques to calculate crowd density from video footage of the relevant
event when such footage is available. 310 He notes that "[w]hen we see shockwaves
[on camera], we know the crowd is well above safe limits ([shockwaves] only occur
when the crowd is physically touching[,] so the density must be above safe
limits)."311 Other scholars have used modeling techniques that assess both the
physical dimensions of the relevant space and the estimated number of individuals
present during the alleged crowd crush to predict crowd density. 312 These
sophisticated, science-based techniques can yield very helpful and precise
calculations of crowd density in crowd crush cases.
Second, circumstantial evidence can also be used to estimate crowd density at
the moment of a plaintiffs alleged injuries. Here, evidence about a number of
factors can be highly probative of the existence of either a high or low-density
crowd: the number of open entrances and exits in the relevant venue, the use of
festival or general admission seating during the event at issue, and the presence of
bottlenecks such as narrow corridors or stairwells within the relevant space.
Eyewitness testimony may also be valuable in estimating crowd density. Witness
answers to questions such as "Could you lift your arms in the crowd?"; "Were the
people around you in dose physical contact?"; and "How much space did you feel

6 See Lee & Hughes, supra note 46, at 581.
3 See Adelman, supra note 22, at 18.
308 See STILL, supra note 112, at 65.

o See e.g., Pin et al., supra note 58, at 287; Moussaid et al., supra note 46, at 6884-85; Lee &
Hughes, supra note 46, at 575-78.
310 E-mail from G. Keith Still, Professor of Crowd Science, Manchester Metro. Univ., to author
(Feb. 17, 2015, 11:43 AM CST) (on file with author).
311Id.
312 See Pin et al., supra note 58, at 287-88; Moussaid et al., supra note 46, at 6885; Lee & Hughes,
supra note 46, at 576-78.
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you had around you?" can help crowd experts "define the local density." 13 Even if
such circumstantial evidence does not permit crowd science experts to calculate a
precise crowd density for a given incident, it can certainly provide enough
information to allow them to draw conclusions about whether the relevant crowd's
density was high or low at the moment of the plaintiffs alleged injuries.
B. The Needfor Expert Testimony
The existence of a robust body of crowd science-and the need to calculate
crowd density in crowd crush cases--strongly suggests that the use of expert
testimony is highly warranted in crowd crush cases. The United States District
Court for the District of Columbia held as such in a 2006 case, Brisbin v.
Washington Sports & Entertainment, Ltd.314 In that case, the plaintiff brought suit
against the owner and operator of the MCI Center in downtown Washington,
DC, for injuries sustained during a hockey game when he was bumped by another
spectator and fell while attempting to leave his seat in order to procure
refreshments. 31 5 The plaintiff contended that the defendant had breached its duty
by "failing to use reasonable care in maintaining, supervising and managing the
dangers in its facility," and "failing to supervise and control its patrons." 316 The
plaintiff failed, however, to provide expert testimony on the appropriate standard of
care "by which to gauge the defendant's actions." 317 The court found that the lack
of an expert on this issue was fatal to the plaintiffs case:
Plaintiff asserts that testimony . . . "regarding the narrow aisles and close
proximity of the seats to each other," supports her negligence claim and thereby
creates an issue of fact for the jury. Fatal to this assertion is the fact that plaintiff
has not filed a Rule 26(b)(4) statement identifying an expert prepared to establish
the appropriate standard of care Washington Sports should have met based on
the Center's physical layout. On the record before the Court, it is dear that it is
beyond the common knowledge of jurors to determine, based on evidence of the
Center's physical layout, what standard of care Washington Sports had a duty to
exercise in the maintenance, supervision and management of its facility ...
Without an appropriate standard of care being delineated by an engineering or
safety expert familiar with arena seating, the jury would be forced to engage in
speculation as to how Washington Sports was deficient in managing the alleged
5
dangers in their facility."'

313E-mail from G. Keith Still, supra note 310.

3" Brisbin v. Wash. Sports & Entm't, Ltd., 422 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 2006).
5
31
Id. at 11.
316id.
3 17

d. at 13.
8 id. (citations omitted).

31
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judgment.

319

the court granted

the defendant's
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motion for summary

Similarly, in Hill v. MetropolitanAfrican Methodist EpiscopalChurch, the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals found it necessary to have expert testimony
regarding the proper standard of care for crowd control in a case involving a crowd
injury that occurred when over a thousand people attempted to exit a church at
roughly the same time. 320 The plaintiff contended that the defendants breached
their duty of care by failing to put ushers "in charge of crowd control for the
departure process" but, like the plaintiff in Brisbin, failed to provide expert
testimony on the issue. 321 The trial court granted the defendants' motion for
summary judgment, stating:
The court finds plaintiffs assertion that "the issue of providing ushers for church
services where attendance is approximately seventeen hundred to two thousand
persons is within the common knowledge and experience of the reasonable juror"

to be erroneous.... The court remains firm in its belief that the duty to provide
crowd control in a church setting is sufficiently unique such that the law requires
some sort of expert testimony in order to establish a basic standard of care that
defendants could have breached. 2

The court of appeals affirmed,323 noting that "[w]ithout the expert testimony of
one familiar with [crowd management] considerations, the jury would be left to
sheer speculation as to various types of crowd control" and what was appropriate
under the circumstances. 3' The court strongly believed that this knowledge was
325
"beyond the ken of the average layperson."
All courts should reach similar conclusions about the need for expert testimony
in crowd crush cases and reject the notion that common sense and conventional
wisdom are sufficient tools to analyze the legal and factual issues in these cases.
C. ExcludingProblematicEvidence
Lastly, courts should exclude the type of evidence they have previously relied on
in crowd crush cases: evidence about official capacity numbers, building code
compliance, and the demographic characteristics of individual crowd members.
Such evidence should be excluded for two reasons. First, for the reasons discussed
at length above, this type of evidence is virtually always irrelevant in crowd crush
cases and thus its admission would almost certainly violate the rules of evidence
9

31 Id. at 16.

31 See Hill v. Metro. African Methodist Episcopal Church, 779 A.2d 906, 907-08 (D.C. 2001).
321Id.
322 Id.
3

at 908.
23Id. at 910.

324 id.

3

25Id.
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within a given jurisdiction. 326 For instance, consideration of the demographic
characteristics of a given crowd-say, that the crowd was primarily composed of
middle-aged women-neither "has any tendency to make a fact more or less
probable than it would be" in the absence of such evidence, nor is it of any
.consequence in determining the action" 27 because, as explained above,
demographic data has little, if any, bearing on whether a crowd crush is likely to
3 28
Thus, such evidence is of no consequence in determining the action (the
occur.
test of relevancy under Federal Rule of Evidence 401 and most equivalent state
rules): it has no legal significance with regard to duty, breach, or causation.
Second, the type of evidence heretofore considered by many courts in crowd
crush cases is also arguably prejudicial and thus in further violation of the relevant
rules of evidence within a given jurisdiction. 329 Evidence about the official capacity
numbers of venues, for example, is incredibly deceptive but also likely to appeal to
juries (and to judges, if prior cases are any guide). 3 30 Venues that are under capacity
can-and often do--experience crowd crush incidents for the reasons set forth
above, but a jury of laypeople unfamiliar with crowd science might be unfairly
swayed by a venue's compliance with capacity numbers because such compliance
provides the illusion that overcrowding could not possibly have occurred. Thus,
such evidence is not probative of any of the issues in typical crowd crush litigation
and is also likely to insert unfair prejudice into the proceedings and "confus[e] the
Rule of Evidence 403 (and equivalent state
issues" in dear contravention of Federal
33
rules) and should be excluded as such. '
In sum, courts should only admit evidence in crowd crush cases that is firmly
rooted in crowd science and its fundamental principles. Conversely, courts should
cast a wary eye upon evidence that arises instead from conventional wisdom about
the nature of crowds or crowd disasters as such evidence tends to be based on
326See, e.g., FED. R. EvlD. 401 ("Evidence is relevant if- (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more

or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining
the action."); TEX. R. EVlD. 401 ("Evidence is relevant if. (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or
less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining
the action.").
327FED. R. EviD. 401.
311 See Pin et al., supra note 58, at 287. There are limited exceptions to this principle with regard to
demographic data pertaining to the physical size of crowd members and whether they were wearing
bulky clothing during the relevant incident. Lee & Hughes, supra note 46, at 579.
329 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 403 ("The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the
issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.');
N.C. R. EvID. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.").
330See, e.g., Lazarus v. Skouras Theatres Corp., 11 A.D.2d 680 (N.Y. App. Div. 1960); Schwartz v.
Madison Square Garden Corp., 283 A.D. 385. 387 (N.Y. App. Div. 1954); Prettyman v. Trenton
Transp.
Co., 73 Pa. Super. 353, 356 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1920).
331
See FED. R. EVID. 403.
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assumptions that have been disproven repeatedly by crowd scientists. Accordingly,
such evidence likely violates evidentiary rules pertaining to both relevance and
prejudice and ought to be excluded from crowd crush litigation.
IV. CONCLUSION

Despite what might appear to be true from the discussion above, crowd crush
cases "are fundamentally simple, based on facts that should be self-evident:
Overcrowding leads to injuries [and] a party that can reasonably foresee harm has a
duty to prevent it."332 However, the combination of "powerful interests insist[ent]
on pursuing . . . dangerous practice[s] like festival seating" and courts either

ignoring or overlooking basic tenets of crowd science has led to a situation in which
333
"victims are truly protected only by their lawyers" in these cases.
Crowd science has repeatedly proven two fundamental principles of crowd
dynamics: (1) crowd density is the single best predictor of crowd-related injuries
and deaths, and (2) physical space and spectator configurations such as bottlenecks
and festival seating drastically increase the likelihood that a crowd will reach a
high-risk density. A multitude of real-life crowd crush incidents in the United
States over the last several decades have provided repeated and tragic illustrations of
these principles in action. Venue owners and event managers, therefore, should not
be able to hide behind weak and scientifically unsound arguments such as
compliance with set capacity numbers or the notion that individual crowd members
were intervening, superseding causes of the plaintiff's injuries to escape what crowd
science has already made clear: crowd crush injuries are eminently foreseeable when
crowds are permitted to reach high-risk densities (or are forced to do so by physical
space configurations).

Furthermore, venue owners and event managers are the only parties that can
prevent crowd crushes from occurring. As discussed at length above, both the lack
of communication between the fronts and backs of crowds and the extremely
limited ability of crowd members to influence the events around them mean that
crowd members themselves cannot protect crowds as a whole from reaching highrisk densities. The preventative measures that owners and managers should take,
moreover, need not be expensive or sophisticated. Basic precautions such as
opening more entrance and exit doors, removing physical objects that could create
bottlenecks from within the venue, and eliminating the use of festival or general
admission seating arrangements can go a tremendously long way in reducing, if not
eliminating, the chances of a crowd crush occurring.
In the absence of a statutory fix, courts must reform their common law crowd
crush jurisprudence to provide greater protection for plaintiffs and to give venue
owners and event managers a stronger incentive to take preventative measures
332Adelman, supra
333

id.

note 22, at 22.
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against crowd injuries. A central part of this reform must entail incorporating the
use of crowd science into the legal analysis of these cases and calling on crowd
scientists to serve as expert witnesses. Reform also requires excluding the type of
scientifically unsound evidence that courts have relied on in past cases. Only after
such reforns are undertaken will the United States begin to get a handle on this
troubling, inexplicably overlooked, and growing issue.

